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I develop a dynamic model of education and labor supply decisions that seeks to explain student
demand elasiticities to the grading standards in their courses, and the high rate of dropout from
STEM majors. The positive correlation in the data between wages and terminal GPA suggests
that firms offer a wage premium to students with higher grades, even after controlling for major.
College students consider these returns to grades when making education decisions: dropout or
major switching can be induced by grade shocks. I estimate a structural model using the NLSY97,
and find that a difference in grades by 1.0 GPA points can impact the net present value of a college
degree by as much as 20 percent at the time of graduation. If STEM and non-STEM course
grading standards were adjusted to be in line with each other, there would be a 4.7 percent increase
in the total number of STEM major graduates, a comparable effect to a $2,200 STEM tuition
subsidy. Finally, a key observation of the model is that due to imperfect sorting across majors and
occupations, large changes in the number of STEM degrees translate into smaller changes in the





There are many people I must thank for their invaluable help in the dissertation process, and in
obtaining a Ph.D. in general.
First, I would like to thank my parents for supporting me and my pursuits. My Ph.D. is a
culmination of three decades of sacrifice, support, and patience on their parts, and I would not
be the person I am today without them. I would also like to thank my extended family for their
encouragement and support. I hope to make you proud.
I must also thank my advisor, Luca Flabbi, for his guidance and feedback during the disserta-
tion process. He had a major role in coalescing my unfocused research interests around my final
dissertation topic. Looking back, I can see how he helped steer me around various pitfalls, and
directed my work towards the most promising areas. His guidance has left an indelible mark on
my dissertation.
The rest of my dissertation committee - Donna Gilleskie, Andrés Hincapié, Fei Li, and Ted
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CHAPTER 1
THE IMPACT OF GRADES ON COLLEGE MAJOR CHOICE, DROPOUT, AND LABOR
OUTCOMES
1.1 Introduction
A key policy concern in US higher education is the high rate of attrition from college, as well as
the high rate of attrition from STEM majors (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics).
Only 60 percent of students who started a bachelor’s program in 2008 obtained a degree by 2014,
and only half of the students who started out interested in STEM courses1 persisted through their
sophomore year, instead switching majors or dropping out entirely (Griffith, 2010).2 STEM majors
made up only 18 percent of all bachelor’s degrees awarded in the US in 2016 (NCES, 2019).
This behavior occurs despite the large differences in earnings between STEM majors, non-STEM
majors, and college dropouts: median lifetime earnings in the US are $1.44 million for mathematics
and statistics majors, $0.99 million for English majors, and $0.72 million for college dropouts
(2014 dollars) (Hamilton Project, 2014).3 Policymakers seeking to increase the number of STEM
workers must first understand the underlying mechanism that drives the proportionally low number
of STEM majors.4
What explains the high rate of attrition from STEM majors, and their overall low representa-
tion? One possibility is the grades a student receives in college have an impact on their earnings
post-graduation. The correlation between grades and earnings is well-documented in the literature,
1‘Interest in STEM’ defined as students directly stating an interest in majoring in STEM, or taking at least half of
their first-year courses in STEM.
2There is no significant compensating transition of non-STEM majors to STEM majors: less than 15 percent of
students initially interested in non-STEM eventually graduate with a STEM degree.
3Values are from the American Community Survey, a representative sample of US workers conducted by the US
Census Bureau.
4For example, in 2012 the President’s Council of Advisors in Science and Technology stated a need for one million
more STEM workers in the US over the following decade (PCAST, 2012).
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with wage regressions estimating a 6-10 percent return to yearly earnings per GPA point (Finnie
et al., 2016; Jones and Jackson, 1990).5 Furthermore, at Duke University, average grades in STEM
courses were lower than those in other majors by ∼ 0.3 GPA points, despite students in STEM
majors having higher average SAT scores (Arcidiacono et al., 2012). These grading differences
between STEM and non-STEM majors are also observed at other universities such as Princeton
University, Wellesley College, and the University of Michigan (Princeton ODC, 2017; Butcher
et al. 2014; Achen and Courant 2009). Thus, students choosing between STEM and non-STEM
majors may be considering the monetary payoffs both to major, and also to the grades that they
expect to receive in that major.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that students care about grading standards is their responses to
university grade deflation policies. Grade deflation policies are meant to counteract grade infla-
tion, the upward trend in historical grades awarded to students: in 1960, the average grade among
all universities in the US was a 2.4; by 2013, the average was over 3.1 (Rojstaczer and Healy,
2010; Rojstaczer, 2016). Given that grades are a useful source of information both to students
and employers, administrators at universities such as Wellesley and Princeton implemented grade
deflation policies: Wellesley placed a cap on the average grade at introductory courses at a 3.33;
Princeton aimed to have at most 35 percent of grades awarded by each department be A’s or A-’s
(Butcher et al. 2014; Princeton Ad Hoc Comm., 2014).6 These policies did not affect all depart-
ments equally: STEM departments were generally already ‘in compliance’, and the affected (i.e.
the ‘policy-treated’) courses or majors were primarily in the humanities and social sciences, ex-
cluding economics. Student response to these policies was strongly negative: ‘treated’ departments
at Wellesley saw a reduction in majors by 30 percent (∼ 8 students), and 59 percent of Princeton
students surveyed in 2014 reported a ‘negative’ or ‘strong negative’ impact of the grade deflation
policy on their college experience.
5The earnings differences between graduates with high and low GPAs, controlling for field of study, do not signif-
icantly widen or shrink over the life cycle.
6These guidelines allowed for instructor discretion in grading, but in practice were effective in achieving their
target grade outcomes.
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To rationalize this strong student response to grades, I propose a dynamic model of educational
and occupational choice where grades show up directly in the expected productivity of workers,
from the perspective of firms. There is evidence that employers use unweighted GPA as one of
the summary statistics of a student’s academic performance (Princeton Ad Hoc Comm., 2014),
and that employers are less likely to interview or hire applicants with low GPAs (Koeppel, 2006;
Piopiunik et al., 2018). There is also evidence that higher grades translate directly into wages:
Khoo and Ost (2018) find that Latin honors, which are awarded for a GPA above a certain numeric
cutoff, command a wage premium. In my model, I allow for a linear log-wage premium associated
with grades and assume that it is constant over experience7; students thus care about the levels of
their grades while in college, since these grades will directly affect lifetime earnings. I am agnostic
about the foundations of the returns to grades (e.g. it may result from employers using grades as
a signal of productivity) and do not explicitly model their origin, although the structure of wage
dynamics that I use is broadly consistent with other findings in the literature, such as Arcidiacono
et al. (2010), which I will discuss in further detail in the model specification section.
My model, based on the dynamic occupational choice framework of Keane and Wolpin (1997),
adds grades to the wage equation for college graduates, and imposes additional structure to the
educational sector. Each year, college students have the option to continue their education by
choosing to focus on STEM or non-STEM, or to drop out. In addition to the preference and wage
shocks standard to these types of dynamic structural models (e.g., Sullivan 2010), students are also
subject to grade shocks: while they know what the distribution of their potential grades is, they
are uncertain about their realized grade. Negative grade shocks can affect a student’s future labor
market earnings, reducing their expected discounted value of graduating and causing them to drop
out instead of trying to graduate with a low GPA. Once students finish their education, they enter
the labor market. I allow the returns to major and grade to vary by occupational sector, since the
literature has found that working in an occupation related to one’s major commands a significant
wage premium (Kinsler and Pavan, 2015; Robst, 2007), and because not all STEM majors work
7In the model, the log-wage gap between high or low GPA students does not change with labor experience.
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in STEM occupations, and vice versa. By taking a structural approach, I am also able to account
for unobserved agent heterogeneity in nonpecuniary preferences for occupation and major, as well
as academic ability and labor market productivity, two factors which complicate estimation of the
wage returns to major via reduced-form methods such as instrumental variables (Altonji et al.,
2016). By modeling the decisions of agents through college and into the labor force, I endogenize
the relationship between major and occupation, and am able to distinguish between graduating
with a degree in STEM versus actually working in STEM occupations.
I estimate my model using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1997), which contains
data on both educational decisions (major choice and dropout) and outcomes (grades), as well
as occupational decisions (occupational sector/hours worked) and outcomes (wages). Having in-
formation both pre- and post-graduation is critical to accounting for the selection processes into
major as well as occupation, and allows for structural identification of parameters such as the re-
turns to major and GPA. While I estimate the model using simulated maximum likelihood, I reduce
the computational burden of the estimation by using the sequential E-M algorithm, as outlined in
Arcidiacono and Jones (2003). By using the E-M algorithm, I am able to sequentially estimate
the labor market parameters and then the educational sector parameters while still allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity.
I estimate significant returns to major as well as grades, which vary by occupational sector: in
STEM affiliated occupations, a STEM major (with average grades) commands a 0.29 premium in
log-wages over a non-STEM major; however, for humanities and social-science affiliated occupa-
tions, a non-STEM major has a 0.24 log-wage premium over STEM. I find the returns to grades
are significantly larger when the major and occupation ‘match’: a 1.0 increase in GPA for STEM
majors in STEM occupations corresponds to an increase in log-wages by 0.20, whereas a 1.0
GPA increase for non-STEM majors in humanities and social-science affiliated occupations only
increases log-wages by 0.003 (the converse, at a smaller magnitude, is also true for non-STEM).
Using my estimated parameters, I conduct a series of counterfactual experiments. First, I
look at the impact of an increase in the wage returns to STEM majors, to assess the elasticity
of demand for major and occupation with respect to earnings. Then, motivated by the observation
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in the literature that STEM courses are graded more stringently than non-STEM courses, I conduct
a series of grading policy counterfactuals, that either deflate non-STEM grades, inflate STEM
grades, or a combination of both. I find that a grading policy that adjusts both STEM grades and
non-STEM grades so that they align (while the grade premium on wages stays constant) increases
the total number of STEM graduates by 4.7 percent relative to baseline, a comparable effect to a
major-specific tuition policy that subsidizes STEM majors by $2,200 yearly and increases tuition
by $660 yearly for non-STEM majors.
Importantly, I find in all of these counterfactuals that the relative increases in STEM major
choice significantly exceed the relative increases in STEM occupation choice: for example, while
the counterfactual grade policy discussed above increased the number of STEM majors by 4.7
percent, the number of STEM workers nine years out increased only by 3.9 percent. The distinction
between STEM majors and STEM workers – which is often glossed over in research that focuses
only on major choice – is an important one, since many educational policies are ultimately more
concerned with the latter rather than the former. For example, while the President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology (2012) cites a ‘need to add to the American workforce over
the next decade approximately 1 million more STEM professionals’, the recommendations are
focused on adding ‘an additional 1 million STEM degrees’ (italics mine).
While there is a large literature on major choice and college dropout, most have as their central
mechanism students learning about their own ability over time and making dynamic decisions
as their uncertainty is resolved (Arcidiacono, 2004; Arcidiacono et al., 2016; Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner, 2013; Stange, 2012). Instead, in my model, students have no uncertainty about their
own ability, only about the grade, preference, and wage shocks in the model. One key difference
of this paper from the existing literature is that, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first to
structurally assess the importance of grading standards themselves on students’ decisions over
major or dropout; grading standards remain fixed in counterfactual analyses in the other papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data as well as the main
stylized moments that motivate the model. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses
identification of the model. Section 5 discusses the estimation procedure. Section 6 outlines the
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estimation results as well as model goodness of fit along a number of dimensions associated with
student selection, sorting, and dropout while in college. Section 7 contains the results of a series
of counterfactual experiments, including grading policy changes. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data Construction
I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 (NLSY97), coupled with Geocode data,
for estimation. The NLSY97 is a nationally representative sample of 8,984 youths between the
ages of 12 and 16 as of December 31, 1996. The first interview was conducted in 1997, with
annual follow-up interviews until 2011, and biannual interviews afterwards (2013, 2015). Since my
model involves yearly decisions, I only use the data up until 2011. I restrict the estimation sample
to men who attended at least one year of a 4-year college and who have college transcript data
from the Post-Secondary Transcript Study (PSTRAN) part of the NLSY97; the PSTRAN provides
information on a student’s courses taken while in college, as well as the grades he received. I
further restrict the data to students who can be represented as potentially graduating in four years
(if they do not drop out); this sample restriction means that among college graduates, I only include
those who finish in four years or who have four years where they take at least six courses that year,
so that I ‘drop’ the year where they take fewer than six courses. This restriction is primarily
for tractability: modeling an intensive margin of course credits or allowing heterogeneity in the
number of years to graduate would make the model much more complex.8 My final estimation
sample consists of 2,887 observations for 306 men. Details about sample construction and data
classification and cleaning are available in the Data Appendix.
The NLSY97 data contain information on SAT scores and high school GPA, college transcripts
for students in college, and occupational sector and annual wages for students in the labor force.
The Geocode supplement to the NLSY97 provides an IPEDS identifier that allows me to deter-
mine the identity of the college the student attended. I use the 2001 U.S. News & World Report
Best Colleges rankings of universities to classify universities as elite or non-elite, depending on
8See Hendricks and Leukhina (2018) and Hsu (2018) for models that look at the accumulation of course credits.
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if they were in the top 50 or not. The IPEDS also reports whether the university is public, pri-
vate religious, private non-religious, or for-profit. Lastly, to determine yearly education costs, I
use historical university-published tuition values as collected by Chronicle of Higher Education
(2018), subtracted by the student’s self-reported scholarships, deflated to 1996 dollars using the
BLS ‘College tuition and fees’ index.9
I classify a student as majoring in STEM in a given year if at least half of the courses he
takes are in STEM departments; my classification of STEM majors is given in Table A.1, and
is similar to Arcidiacono et al. (2016). Roughly, ‘STEM’ means natural sciences, engineering,
mathematics. Grades are calculated by taking the average of the reported numeric term grades in
each academic year, or if not reported, by taking an average of grades over all courses taken that
year. I take the student’s highest reported SAT scores, or use their predicted SAT scores given their
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB) scores, if those are missing; I do not
distinguish between the two measures in estimation. The linear regression that I use to predict SAT
scores is given in Table A.2.
I classify a student as working if he worked on average 20 hours a week for that year, and for
college graduates, I assign him to one of three occupational sectors – STEM affiliated, humanities
and social science (HSS) affiliated, and unaffiliated – using his 2002 Census Occupational Cate-
gory; the mapping is given in Table A.3. I define the three occupation categories based on whether
the occupations directly relate to a student’s coursework and education in the corresponding ma-
jors: ‘STEM affiliated occupations’ are those that require skills directly obtained in a ‘Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics’ major (e.g., engineers); ‘HSS affiliated occupations’
as those that require coursework in humanities and social sciences (e.g., teachers); and ‘unaffili-
ated occupations’ are those that do not clearly require coursework in a particular major, and largely
include ‘blue’ and ‘pink’ collar occupations (e.g. salespeople).10 All working college dropouts are
9I assume all students at a public school are charged the in-state tuition value. While students self-report tuition
values in the NLSY97, I find the data to be unreliable, as a majority of my sample reported receiving financial aid
exceeding their reported tuition.
10In other words, if a job posting for a typical job in a given occupation requires a student have a bachelor’s degree
in a particular major, the occupation is affiliated with that major.
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classified as working in a single unskilled sector. Hourly earnings are calculated by taking re-
ported yearly income and weekly hours worked for the year, scaled to an equivalent of 2087 hours
worked over 52 weeks11, and deflated to 1996 dollars.12 I do not consider advanced degrees in
my estimation, so I drop observations for individuals once they start working towards their PhD
or professional degree (DDS, JD, MD), and afterwards. I do not find consistent jumps in earnings
for individuals who obtain a masters degree, across all three occupation types, so I ignore mas-
ters degrees in my wage equation specification and do not drop those observations. Furthermore,
while there is evidence that students that pursue PhDs or professional degrees are stronger academ-
ically, they actually earn less in their first jobs out of college than students that do not eventually
pursue advanced degrees (see Tables A.4 and A.5 and the accompanying discussion in the Data
Appendix), suggesting that my final estimates may actually understate the returns to grades.
Lastly, in the data there are a large number of individuals who have missing data for their edu-
cation outcomes, but that eventually obtain a bachelor’s degree and have labor market observations
(848 observations over 184 men). Since these individuals are observably different from the indi-
viduals for whom I have complete educational and labor data, in particular in the percentage of
them obtaining a STEM degree, I do not use them in my main estimation of the model. However,
I do use these individuals as a part of an out of sample evaluation of goodness of fit of my labor
market parameter estimates.
1.2.2 Data Descriptives
Table 1.1 shows the results of a series of simple wage regressions, split by skilled occupational
sector, controlling for own-sector experience and major, and varying in the form of dependency
on grades. There is a positive and significant coefficient on grades for STEM occupations, a
positive but insignificant coefficient for HSS, and a small and insignificant negative coefficient for
unaffilated, across all three specifications. Notably, when I include the interaction of GPA and
11The 2087 yearly hours value is derived from the US Office of Personnel Management.
12The NLSY97 has automatically-calculated hourly wages, but I found these numbers to be unreliable, e.g. with
large variation in year-to-year values when yearly income and hours worked were relatively stable. I deflate earnings
to 1996 dollars using the BLS Historical CPI-U, and bottom- and top-code at the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent levels
($3.22 and $48.41 per hour, respectively).
8
Table 1.1: Observed Log-Wage Regression Results
STEM Occ. HSS Occ. Unaffiliated Occ.
Constant 2.599 2.443 2.528 2.742 2.711 2.751 2.982 3.002 2.994
(.213) (.333) (.219) (.161) (.246) (.164) (.190) (.281) (.196)
Exp .166 .227 .185 .249 .245 .258 .096 .088 .093
(.040) (.106) (.042) (.031) (.090) (.033) (.031) (.092) (.034)
Exp2 × 100 -1.16 -1.12 -1.00 -2.17 -2.17 -2.06 .09 .11 .09
(.59) (.60) (.60) (.48) (.49) (.50) (.44) (.45) (.44)
STEM Major .287 .288 .289 -.253 -.253 -.253 -.107 -.107 -.108
(.060) (.060) (.060) (.078) (.078) (.078) (.077) (.077) (.077)
GPA .151 .199 .168 .077 .074 .084 -.019 -.026 -.022
(.063) (.100) (.064) (.049) (.077) (.028) (.061) (.090) (.029)
GPA× Exp -.019 .001 .003
(.031) (.027) (.027)
GPA× 1[Exp ≥ 4] -.047 -.027 .007
(.033) (.028) (.029)
N 198 370 422
R2 .363 .365 .370 .277 .277 .278 .199 .200 .200
Note: Coefficients are for yearly log-earnings, in thousands. Exp. is own-sector experience, not
counting other-sector experience, and is measured in years.
experience, I find the coefficient to be very small relative to GPA and insignificant; this finding
suggests that the ‘returns’ to GPA are constant over the experience profile. Lastly, the differences
in the coefficients on majoring in STEM suggest that the return to STEM is heterogeneous in
occupation.
Looking at the characteristics of students who persist in college (Table 1.2), we see that high
school measures of academic ability (SAT scores and high school GPA) and realized college grades
are increasing with tenure for persisters. While the positive trend in high school ability, which
is ‘pre-determined’ prior to college, suggests that students who drop out are less academically
prepared than those who persist, interpreting the increase in realized college grades as evidence of
positive selection on academic ability is complicated by the fact that grading standards may change
by year: courses taken by a student in their fourth year of college may be graded more leniently
than those in their first year. Lastly, there is also evidence of sorting by major: students majoring
in STEM have higher average SAT scores and high school GPAs than non-STEM majors.
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Table 1.2: Average SAT/HS GPA and Grade Outcomes, by Major Choice and Year in School
Major Year N
SAT Math SAT Verbal HS GPA Yearly Grade
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
STEM
1 74 597 (106) 557 (91) 3.30 (.47) 2.78 (.96)
2 63 613 (90) 570 (84) 3.40 (.47) 3.13 (.77)
3 49 625 (88) 569 (86) 3.46 (.42) 3.23 (.81)
4 43 644 (72) 583 (70) 3.54 (.35) 3.45 (.43)
Non-STEM
1 232 556 (99) 549 (93) 3.18 (.48) 2.86 (.83)
2 194 569 (96) 560 (89) 3.24 (.43) 2.91 (.70)
3 176 581 (91) 569 (89) 3.31 (.42) 3.02 (.65)
4 159 586 (91) 573 (85) 3.36 (.38) 3.22 (.60)
Note: Yearly grade is the grade received for that year, not cumulative GPA.
Table 1.3: Labor Market Characteristics by Occupational Sector
Occupational Sector: STEM HSS Unaffiliated
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
% Workers with STEM Major 62.8 (3.4) 9.6 (1.5) 10.5 (1.5)
Ann. Log-Earnings, STEM Major 3.58 (.35) 3.01 (.39) 2.63 (.41)
Ann. Log-Earnings, Non-STEM Major 2.66 (.46) 3.06 (.55) 2.95 (.57)
N 207 387 445
Note: Annual log-earnings are in thousands of dollars, and are for observed wages 2 years after
graduation (there are a large proportion of choices in home production in the first year).
Table 1.3 presents some summary characteristics of workers in each occupational sector. Re-
garding the mapping between major and occupation, there is mixing: some non-STEM majors
work in STEM occupations, and vice versa. Furthermore, although a STEM major earns log-wages
that are on average 0.57 higher in STEM occupations than HSS occupations (and even higher rel-
ative to unaffiliated occupations), approximately 10 percent of the workers in the non-STEM and
unaffiliated sectors have STEM degrees. The reverse is also true for workers in STEM occupations
but with degrees in non-STEM. This statistic suggests the presence of nonpecuniary preferences
for occupation, since the variation in occupational choice is not fully explained by variation in
wages.
My model explains two stylized facts: college GPA is positively correlated with labor market
earnings, and students who persist in college are progressively stronger in pre-college character-
istics than those who drop out. To account for the imperfect sorting along major and occupation,
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I include nonpecuniary preferences for occupation in my model; this feature will prove important
when measuring the ‘pass-through’ rate of changes in numbers of STEM majors to changes in
STEM workers, as well as accounting for selection into major and occupation. My model also
replicates a number of other moments of the data, such as the general wage profile and choice
patterns of education and occupation. Finally, when considering policy experiments, I show that
my counterfactual results replicate the negative student choice response to grade deflation policies,
as observed in the literature.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Overview
I now describe the key characteristics of the model. After graduating from high school and
being accepted to a particular university, agents make yearly decisions over education or labor
alternatives. For those students who have not yet dropped out or graduated, they can either take
courses in STEM or non-STEM majors (subject to a few choice restrictions to be outlined later), or
choose to drop out of college and engage in either unskilled labor or home production. Dropping
out of college is absorbing: there is no re-entry. For agents who have dropped out of college, they
receive wage offers from a single unskilled labor sector, and can choose to work or engage in home
production. For agents who successfully graduate from college, they receive three wage offers from
the three types of skilled occupational sectors (STEM affiliated, HSS affiliated, and unaffiliated),
and can choose to work in any one of the three sectors, or engage in home production. There
is complete labor market separation between graduates and dropouts: graduates do not have the
option to work in the unskilled sector, and dropouts do not have the option to work in any of the
skilled sectors. There is no option for graduate school or further education, and agents have a finite
horizon decision problem ending at some terminal retirement age.
Agents are forward-looking and choose a sequence of actions that yields the highest expected
lifetime utility. Per-period utility derives from wages as well as a flow utility for each alterna-
tive (psychic/nonpecuniary cost or consumption value of working/education). Agents are uncer-
tain over grade shocks, wage shocks, and preference shocks; however, they know perfectly their
endowments, which include academic ability and labor market productivity. Agents also know
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perfectly the structural parameters that dictate the grade generating process as well as wage offer
process (i.e. technology).
1.3.2 Agent Endowments
Agents are heterogeneous in both observed and unobserved (to the researcher) dimensions.
Observed characteristics for agent i are denoted by the vector XHSi and include the agent’s SAT
Math and Verbal scores, as well as their high school GPA. In the style of Heckman and Singer
(1984), I also use a finite mixture approach for agent-specific unobserved heterogeneity: agents
are one of three researcher-unobserved types, and these types differ in the dimensions of academic
ability and preferences, and productivity and preferences by occupational sector. Agents know
their type perfectly. Denote the three types by {θ1, θ2, θ3} with corresponding population propor-
tions {π1, π2, π3}. I do not assume any particular form of correlation between agent observable
characteristics and unobserved type.
1.3.3 Labor Market Sector
The labor market sector consists of two broad types of sectors, the skilled and unskilled sectors,
which are completely separate. Since my dissertation is focused on the margin of major switching
among students who intend to graduate, I further divide the skilled sector into three occupational
types, while treating the unskilled sector as a single ‘occupational type’. College graduates make
their labor decisions over 30 periods following their graduation, up to a terminal period of t = 34;
college dropouts can make labor decisions starting as soon as they drop out until t = 34.13
The skilled sector consists of STEM affiliated, HSS affiliated, or unaffiliated occupational sec-
tors. A college graduate can choose to work in any of these three skilled occupational sectors
j = 1, 2, 3 or engage in home production j = H , regardless of his major; however, his expected
productivity may differ for each sector. Within each of the occupational sectors, firms are identical:
the agent thus makes decisions over occupational sectors for each year. These sectors are compet-
itive between firms, and firms have the same information: thus firms offer the agent his expected
13There is no additional terminal payoff at t = 34, e.g. a retirement payoff that depends on some state variables.
This formulation is the same as Keane and Wolpin (1997). Empirically, since I do not have observations close to the
terminal period, it will be very difficult to identify a final terminal payoff from alternative-specific flow utilities in each
period. Discounting also makes the impact fairly minor.
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productivity given the firm’s information. An agent that works in a particular sector j receives that
particular wage offer, and also accumulates one unit of experience in sector j .
I assume that log-productivity in skilled occupational sector j can be expressed as the sum of
a deterministic component of productivity that depends on the rental rate of labor in that sector,
agent endowments in that sector, a student’s terminal major and GPA, and human capital from
the vector of accumulated work experience; as well as an idiosyncratic productivity shock (i.e. a
period-specific match quality or some fleeting productivity shock that is common to the sector).
I allow all of these components to vary by occupational sector j. In particular, I assume the log-
productivity of the worker from the perspective of the firm is shifted by an indicator for whether
the student’s terminal major was in STEM, and linearly with respect to their GPA, with the returns
to GPA allowed to differ by major; these returns to major and GPA do not change with work
experience (see Eqn. 1.1). This specification is consistent with the results of my reduced form
wage regression (Table 1.1) as well as other empirical findings in the literature. Finnie et al.
(2016) find that, after controlling for field of study, there is a log-wage premium for having higher
grades and the time-grade interaction term is not significantly different from zero for most fields of
study.14 Arcidiacono et al. (2010) apply an employer-learning model (i.e., the model of Altonji and
Pierret 2001) to the NLSY79 and find that while underlying productivity, as measured by AFQT
scores, is initially hidden from employers and revealed over time for high school graduates, it is
essentially revealed immediately for college graduates; empirically, this is shown by estimating
the AFQT-experience interaction term to be zero for college graduates. If grades were one useful
predictor of productivity and there was no additional employer learning after an individual starts
working, then one would expect the grade-experience interaction coefficient to be zero as well, as
in my model’s specification. That being said, my model is a partial equilibrium model that focuses
on agent responses to returns on grades and major; I do not take a stand on the precise mechanism
14They obtain a negative estimate of the time-grade interaction for males in engineering (significant at 5 percent
level), but a positive time-grade interaction for sciences and agriculture. Estimates for other fields are insignificant at
the 5 percent level.
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generating the returns to grades and major.15
In the skilled sector, the agent i of type n has an expected log-productivity in sector j that
depends on the skill rental rate rj0, his type-specific skill endowment in that sector r
n,j
end, an indi-
cator for university quality Qi, an indicator for whether his terminal major was in STEM Mi, his
unweighted terminal GPA Gi (and the interaction with his major), his vector of accumulated expe-




it) and an i.i.d. productivity shock ε
W
ijt ∼ N(0, σ2j ).16 There is no
correlation between the technology shocks across sectors or across time. The functional form of the
log-productivity is a quadratic in own-sector experience and linear in other-sector experience, with
an additional first-year experience effect. Finally, I impose a constraint that the own-experience
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The constraint that the experience profile in own-sector cannot be decreasing is added to stabilize
the estimation procedure: the discounted future payoffs are very sensitive to the magnitude of the
quadratic term, which has poor empirical identification.17
15Later, when discussing specific counterfactual policies, I argue that the conclusions of my partial equilibrium
model are likely to be close to reality even in a general equilibrium setting.
16The only relevant characteristic of the university itself in the labor market is its dummy for quality. I observe other
characteristics of the university such as whether it is public/private, which are relevant in the educational decisions but
not in the labor market productivity.
17I observe on average six years of occupational choice and wage data for each college graduate, with fairly linear
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There is only one occupational sector available to dropouts: the unskilled sector. The agent’s
log-productivity is a non-decreasing quadratic in unskilled experience xUit . There is no heterogene-
ity in the skill endowments by unobserved type n. Because unskilled workers by definition do
not have a college degree, there is no dependency on grades, major, or college quality; however,
I do allow the log-productivity intercept and first-year experience effect to vary if the individual
dropped out or failed out at year four (y = 4) vs. earlier (y < 4).18 The returns to experience
outside of the first-year experience effect are constrained to be the same for all dropouts. The
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For each skilled occupational alternative j, the agent’s per-period flow utility is a linear function
of his wage offer W j(snit) (i.e., the productivity including the shock) multiplied by γ
p; a nonpecu-
niary psychic cost γj(snit) which depends on his unobserved type n; his history of choices, college
outcomes, and shocks up to and including time t, denoted by snit; and a Type I extreme value pref-
erence shock εPijt (technically ε
P
ijt is included in s
n






p ·W j(snit) + εPijt, j ∈ {U, 1, 2, 3} (1.5)
γj(snit) consists of a constant term γ
n,j
cons which depends on the occupation and agent type, but also
two additional nonpecuniary terms: an ‘entry cost’ γjentry that applies if the agent has no prior
experience in the specific occupational sector, a ‘switching cost’ γjswitch that applies if the agent
wage growth. According to the American Community Survey, yearly wages for full-time workers with a college
degree peak and start to decrease at around 20-25 years in the workforce (Hamilton Project, 2014).
18The year four effect could be interpreted as partial human capital accumulation from college for dropouts.
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did not work in sector j in the prior period t− 1, and a sector-specific shifter γjfirst that applies for








it = 0] + γ
j
switch · 1[di,t−1 6= j] + γ
j
first · 1[t = 5], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(1.6)
The entry cost, first year out of college, and switching costs do not vary by unobserved type n.
For the unskilled sector, the functional form of the nonpecuniary flows is analogous, but with-
out the first-year out of college costs. I also allow the per-period flow utility and switching cost to






entry · 1[xUit = 0] + γ
U,y
switch · 1[di,t−1 6= U ] (1.7)
Students who drop out or fail out in their fourth year differ from those that drop out earlier in
their level and first-year effect of unskilled wage offers, as well as their per-period flow utility and
nonpecuniary switching costs with unskilled labor; the other parameters are the same. There is no
heterogeneity in the unskilled labor market by type n.
Lastly, if the agent engages in home production, I assume it does not generate any income, and
I normalize the per-period flow utility from home production to zero, so that the per-period flow







As is apparent in the wage equations (Eqns. 1.1, 1.2), a student’s performance while in college
as well as his choice of major affects his labor market earnings. Students must therefore take
into account the impact of his uncertain educational outcomes on his later lifetime earnings when
making educational decisions. I do not allow for transfers between colleges, and I only consider
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individuals who are observed to attend at least one year of college. Thus, the quality q of the
college as well as the type of college (public, private religious, private non-religious, or for-profit)
is fixed for the agent. While in college, agents have up to four alternatives: take a course load
specializing in STEM or non-STEM, or engaging in home production or working in the unskilled
labor market. The latter two options are available at any time while in college, and are considered
dropout: the student is only be able to work in the unskilled sector or engage in home production
for the rest of their lifetime if they drop out.
Agents receive a nonpecuniary flow utility from choosing STEM S or non-STEM N for that
year, which varies by his unobserved type n, the type of university s the student attends (public,
private religious, private non-religious, or for-profit), the cost of tuition minus grants/scholarships
ctuiti , and a Type I extreme value preference shock.
19 I also include a switching cost for each major











switch · 1{di,t−1 6= j and t ≥ 2}+ γ
s,j, j ∈ {S,N} (1.10)
γn,sijt , j ∈ {S,N} can be thought of as the psychic cost/consumption benefit of attending college and
specializing in major j, which varies through the individual’s type via γn,jcons (the type has varying
preferences for major) and university type via γs,j (majors differ in their consumption values across
different university types s), and εPijt is a Type I extreme value preference shock. This flow utility
does not change over the four years of college. Note that the flow utility of college does not
depend on the student’s academic ability or grades. The flow utilities for home production and the
unskilled sector are the same as in the labor market. Lastly, if the student successfully graduates
19School quality does not affect the nonpecuniary flow utility of college. The net cost of education is assumed to be
constant over each year.
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from college, then they receive a one-time nonpecuniary payoff γgrad at the start of the next period,
t = 5, which is the same across student types n and university types s.
After enrolling in a major, the agent receives a single grade that represents the average of all
their grades for that year.20 In each year, after deciding to enroll in STEM or non-STEM, the agent
of type n at university of quality q receives a grade Gn,qijt in major j which depends on his high
school characteristics XHSi (SAT scores and high school GPA) through λ
HS
j , the year and quality
of the university through λqj,t, his type-specific major ability A
n
j , and an idiosyncratic grade shock
εGiqjt ∼ N(0, σ2qjt) which has a variance that depends on the quality of the university, the major, and








(1{t = s} · λqjt) + Anj + εGiqjt, j ∈ {S,N}, t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (1.11)
Thus, between elite and non-elite universities, grades in the same major have the same returns to
SAT scores and high school GPA λHSj , but the levels of the grades λ
q
jt as well as the variances of
the grade shocks σ2qjt may differ. To identify the levels of the grade parameters, I normalize the
major-specific ability term Anj to be zero for type n = 1 individuals, for both majors.
Importantly, grades are revealed after the individual chooses a major. The agent must take
expectations over their grade outcomes: he knows all of the parameters in the grade generating
process, so he can perfectly forecast his potential distribution of grades for both majors, but not
the precise outcome. These grade shocks will be a major driver of the decision to switch or drop
majors.
Lastly, I introduce a series of choice restrictions while in college which are meant to capture
some aspects of the ‘switching costs’ between majors. They are:
1. Major declaration at year 3: The student’s choice of major at time t = 4 must be the same as
his choice of major at t = 3, unless he dropped out.
20In reality, students do not face a binary choice between STEM and non-STEM, but rather an intensive choice of
how many courses to take in each major. I do not model this intensive margin, and treat the yearly choice of major as
a binary variable. See Hsu (2018) for an example of a model which considers the intensive margin of course credits.
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2. STEM major pre-requisite: To choose STEM at t = 3, the student must have chosen STEM
in at least one of the two prior years, t = 1, 2.
3. Deterministic graduation and failout. After four years in college, the student’s unweighted
cumulative GPAGi, the simple average of their four yearly grades, is calculated. IfGi < 2.0,
the student fails out of college and can only work in the unskilled sector. Otherwise, he enters
the skilled sector in the next period with his terminal major corresponding to the major choice
at t = 4, and terminal GPA Gi.
As is shown in the Data Appendix, the first two restrictions are largely borne out by the data; the
largest restriction is actually the condition that students graduate within four years.
1.3.5 Agent Problem and Model Summary
To summarize, the model timing and sequential decision process is as follows:
1. Agent i of type n enters period t with his history snit.
2. Each eligible firm forms a match-specific productivity shock with the individual εWijt and sub-
mits a wage offer. When in college or in the unskilled workforce, the agent only receives
wage offers for the unskilled sector j = U . When in the skilled workforce, he observes wage
offers for each skilled sector j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Wage offers depend on his college performance,
accumulated experience, and the productivity shock. Unskilled productivity shocks are dis-
tributed N(0, σ2U), and skilled productivity shocks are distributed N(0, σ
2
j ), j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
3. Preference shocks εPijt are also revealed for all employment and education alternatives avail-
able to the agent.
4. Each period, The agent evaluates each alternative dit(snit, {εPijt, εWijt}j) in his feasible set, and
its corresponding flow utility u(dit(snit), s
n
it). He chooses the alternative that maximizes his
expected discounted lifetime utility at time t.
5. Grades Gn,qijt = G
j
it are then revealed if the student chose major j ∈ {N,S}. The agent
receives a diploma if he successfully graduated, along with a corresponding graduation flow
utility.
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6. If the agent has not yet graduated or dropped out, he can continue taking courses by choosing
N or S. Otherwise, he continues receiving wage and preference shocks over his employment
alternatives in each period, and makes choices over those employment alternatives.
As is standard in the dynamic discrete choice literature, I assume agents are forward-looking and








{1[dit = j] · uj(snit)}|sni,t−1] (1.12)
Note that uj(snit) includes the wage and preference shocks for individual i at time t. Define V (s
n
it)
to be the value of lifetime utility at time t, conditional on knowing all state variables. It is given
by:








{1[dit = j] · uj(snit)}] (1.13)
where, similarly to before, the expectation is taken prior to unrealized wage, preference, and grade
shocks. We then have the standard recursive Bellman equation at an arbitrary period t:




it) + βEt[V (s
n
i,t+1)|snit, dit = j]] (1.14)
To solve the dynamic discrete choice problem, the agents solve backwards from the terminal period
T (with the continuation value V (sni,T+1) defined to be zero), taking expectations of the discounted
future values of their occupational choices by integrating over preference and wage shocks. Note
that when I solve the model, I will calculate the ex-ante value functions Et[V (sni,t+1)|snit, dit = j],
where the expectation is computed by integrating over the wage and preference shocks at t+ 1.
These value functions are solved back to when the agent is making educational decisions, where
both the value of graduating with a particular major and GPA combination (given the agent’s type)
as well as the values of dropping out of college are defined.
21This sequence of decisions depends on the partial history of shocks revealed up to time t.
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1.4 Identification
In this section I discuss the intuition for identification of the model. The model can be split
into two parts: the labor market and the educational sector. In the labor market, the model strongly
resembles Sullivan (2010) in that there are wage shocks as well as preference shocks, so the iden-
tification arguments are similar. Wages are observed, providing information about all of the wage
parameters (rj)j . It should be noted that the type-specific endowment rn,jend and the rental rate r
j
0
are not separately identified without a normalization: I, instead, estimate their sum, which acts as
a sector-type-specific log-wage intercept.
The wage observations are subject to standard selection bias: wages are only observed for the
agent’s chosen occupation. In a similar manner to the static sample selection case, conditional on
my distributional assumption (log-normal wages), I estimate a selection-corrected wage equation
for each sector by maximizing the joint choice and wage likelihood. In particular, in the final
decision period prior to T , the problem is static, and the selection rules are generated by the non-
pecuniary flows γnijt associated with each occupational sector; for periods t < T , the continuation
values from the dynamic discrete choice model provide the selection rules. This also provides
identification of the discount factor β, since the continuation values (and hence choice behavior)
depend directly on the discount factor. The values of the non-pecuniary flow utilities γnijt are iden-
tified by variation in the agent’s observed choices that are not explained by observables, namely
occupation-specific wages. A strong source of identification of the non-pecuniary flows for each
occupation comes from the choice frequency of home production since, by assumption, home pro-
duction generates no income and has flow utility normalized to zero. Similarly, the rate of change
in frequency of the decision to engage in home production as wages increase over the life-cycle
identifies the relative preference for money γp: for example, if as an agent accumulated experience
and potential wages rose, the frequency of home production stayed relatively constant, that would
suggest a small value of γp.
A similar identification argument applies for the estimation of the education sector’s parame-
ters. When estimating the grade equations as given in Eqn. 1.11, since grades are only observed
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for the chosen major, I must jointly estimate the grade equations with the choice likelihoods, con-
sidering the selection rule generated by the agent’s optimization problem over the expected payoffs
of each terminal educational outcome (graduation with a particular grade in a particular major, or
dropping out), in an analagous manner to the labor market case. To separately identify the unob-
served heterogeneity in ability and preferences, I use the model’s assumption that an agent’s choice
of major only depends on ability through their impact on grades.22
Unobserved heterogeneity occurs through the permanent researcher-unobserved types n, and
affects grades and wages received, as well as the likelihood of making particular occupational
and educational choices. Students with similar grades and the same major who choose different
occupations and earn different amounts would be predicted to be of differing types, with those dif-
ferences unexplained by major, GPA, and experience identifying the wage and preference compo-
nents of unobserved heterogeneity. Similarly, students who choose non-STEM majors over STEM
majors when their observable SAT scores and high school GPA would predict a strong STEM
performance would be predicted to have strong preferences for non-STEM courses; their actual
performance in their chosen field would identify their academic ability Anj . The link between labor
and educational unobserved heterogeneity within type n is captured by observing both types of
outcomes for the same individual.
1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Overview
I estimate the model via simulated maximum likelihood, where the likelihoods are derived from
the observed choices and outcomes, and the simulations occur when I integrate over unobserved
wage shocks; to do so, I discretize the distribution of the relevant shocks and take an average of the
choice probabilities conditional on the shock. The likelihood expressions as well as the specific
implementation of the integration are discussed in the Appendix. I show that in the case without
unobserved type heterogeneity, the log-likelihood is additively separable, allowing for sequential
estimation; adding unobserved heterogeneity destroys the additive separability, which I restore by
22If an agent derived utility from grades, academic ability would impact flow utility both directly through grades
and indirectly through grades via potential earnings.
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using the sequential E-M algorithm, as outlined in Arcidiacono and Jones (2003).
While he is in the labor market sector, the agent’s experience, major, and GPA are observed,
with unobserved heterogeneity factoring into the sector-specific productivity endowments as well
as preferences for each alternative. Integrating over the potential wage shocks allows for the con-
struction of the ex-ante value functions, which can then be used to calculate the alternative-specific
value functions in the agent’s decision problem, which in turn are necessary to compute the choice
likelihoods.
1.5.2 The E-M Algorithm and Sequential Estimation
In the case of no unobserved heterogeneity, the model can be sequentially estimated: first
the labor market coefficients, then the educational sector coefficients. When in the labor market,
agents are identical conditional on their terminal major, GPA, and school type: the likelihood no
longer depends on the agent’s choices and outcomes while in college. This can also be seen by
direct inspection of the likelihood contributions for labor observations (in the Appendix): they
do not depend on the grade parameters conditional on the final GPA. Thus, I first estimate the
wage coefficients (rj)j , the components of the non-pecuniary flows for each occupational choice
γijt, and the relative preference for money γp. I then solve the agent’s dynamic discrete choice
problem backwards to the time of first entry into the labor market, establishing the terminal payoffs
for each educational outcome. Finally, I estimate the education parameters, namely the grade
coefficients λHSj and λ
q
jt, the variances of the grade shocks σ
2
qjt, and the non-pecuniary flows for
the educational alternatives γsj . As shown in Arcidiacono and Jones (2003), these estimates are
consistent, although statistically less efficient than jointly maximizing the full likelihood. The
main advantage is computational: the maximization problem over the entire parameter space is
now split into two smaller maximization problems over subsets of the parameter space.
The addition of unobserved heterogeneity via unobserved types destroys the additive separa-
bility of the log-likelihoods of observations in the labor and educational markets, since they both
depend on the unobserved type n, and prevents sequential estimation. However, the E-M algorithm
allows for sequential estimation.
Explicitly, if I divide the parameter space Θ into two vectors of parameters: labor parameters
23
ΘL and educational parameters ΘE , with unobserved types (θn)n and corresponding proportions
(πn)n, the total likelihood expression is given by:
∑
n







where f(θn, xi; Θ) is the likelihood of a series of observations xi conditional on them being type
n, and fL(·), fE(·) are the corresponding expressions for the labor and education likelihood con-






P (n|xi; Θ̂, π̂) · ln(f(θn, xi; Θ)) (1.16)
where P (n|xi; Θ̂, π̂) is the posterior probability that individual i is type n, given observations
xi. Importantly, with this formulation, f(θn, xi; Θ) can be decomposed into fL(θn, xi; ΘL) ·












P (n|xi; Θ̃, π̃) · ln(fE(θn, xi; Θ̃L,ΘE)) (1.18)
where Θ̃ and π̃ are the current estimated model parameters and type proportions. The sequential
estimation procedure proceeds by using some initial estimates of all of the parameters and type
proportions to calculate the posterior probabilities P (n|xi; Θ̃, π̃) for each individual, maximizing
the labor likelihood component with respect to the labor parameters ΘL to obtain Θ̃L, then taking
those estimated labor parameters Θ̃L as given in order to obtain estimates Θ̃Eof the education
parameters. The population proportions are then updated by taking an average of the posterior





P (n|xi; Θ̃, π̃) (1.19)
and then the algorithm repeats until some convergence criterion is met, which I take to be if the
posterior type proportions π̃′n become sufficiently close between iterations.
1.6 Estimation Results and Discussion
Although in principle the discount factor β and the relative preference for money γp are iden-
tified from the data, the empirical identification is not strong. As a result of examining goodness
of fit at various values, I fixed β = 0.90 and γp = 0.045, and estimate the other parameters. In
order for the estimation to be feasible, I discretize the terminal GPA of students to the nearest .2
GPA points, ranging from 2.0 to 4.0, for a total of 21 × 2 × 2 = 84 calculations of ex-ante value
functions over both STEM and non-STEM terminal majors and elite/non-elite university quality; I
interpolate between these outcomes to approximate the value function integration over grade out-
comes for students in their fourth year of college. I place a few restrictions on the parameter values
for the labor market: the return to experience in every sector is constrained to be non-negative,
the quadratic term in own-experience is negative, and the entry costs are constrained to be non-
negative.23 However, I do not constrain the returns on GPA to be non-negative: it is possible that
the returns to grades are negative for particular sector-major combinations.
1.6.1 Labor Market
My estimates of the labor market coefficients are given in Table 1.4 for the skilled labor market
and Table 1.5 for the unskilled labor market. First note that the unobserved types of individuals
(θ1, θ2, θ3) each have a comparative productivity advantage for a particular labor sector (STEM,
HSS, unaffiliated, respectively). There is a strong degree of comparative advantage, especially for
type 1 in the STEM affiliated sector over other types, on the order of 0.45 log-wage units. There are
smaller but qualitatively similar productivity advantages for the other two types in their respective
23Given the high degree of persistence in occupation, empirical identification of returns to off-sector experience is
weak.
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Table 1.4: Skilled Labor Market Parameter Estimates by Occupational Sector
STEM Aff. HSS Aff. Unaff.
Wage Coefficients
Type 1 3.0529 (.0301) 2.6244 (.0268) 2.4603 (.0228)
Type 2 2.5637 (.0440) 2.7212 (.0261) 2.4005 (.0266)
Type 3 2.6153 (.0718) 2.3557 (.0340) 2.8427 (.0217)
STEM Major -.3574 (.0361) -.0718 (.0372) -.2085 (.0410)
GPA (Non-STEM Major) .0029 (.0086) .0760 (.0082) .0313 (.0056)
GPA (STEM Major) .1953 (.0094) .0218 (.0082) .0361 (.0095)
School Quality .1715 (.0142) .1450 (.0137) .0784 (.0118)
STEM Exp. .0926 (.0043) .0438 (.0057) .0962 (.0036)
Non-STEM Exp. .0863 (.0039) .1204 (.0037) .1000 (.0028)
Unaff. Exp. .0292 (.0061) .0352 (.0038) .1072 (.0021)
Own Exp2 × 100 -.2915 (.0177) -.3366 (.0152) -.0670 (.0079)
At Least One Exp. .1423 (.0114) .1652 (.0107) .0809 (.0111)
Productivity Shock Var. .1203 (.0061) .1849 (.0063) .2040 (.0057)
Nonpecuniary Flows
Type 1 -.9594 (.0769) -.7737 (.0591) -1.5967 (.0578)
Type 2 -1.1813 (.0868) -1.0995 (.0700) -.8012 (.0542)
Type 3 -.5004 (.127) -.5335 (.0789) -.8054 (.0667)
First Year After Grad. -1.002 (.1135) -.9656 (.0990) -.3179 (.0949)
No Prior Exp. -.8488 (.0954) -.8159 (.1032) .000 (.1029)
Switching Cost if Diff.
2.6704 (.1401) 1.7211 (.1308) 1.9617 (.1165)
Prior Period Choice
Note: Wage coefficients are reported in log-units of yearly thousands of dollars. Bootstrap standard
errors are in parentheses.
sectors.
For each occupational sector, the returns to GPA are significantly higher if the major matches
the occupation: a 1.0 increase in GPA for STEM majors working in the STEM sector results in an
increase in wages by 0.195 log-units, while only 0.003 log-units for non-STEM majors working
in the STEM sector. A similar effect occurs for non-STEM majors in HSS occupations, while
in the unaffiliated sector the returns to GPA are similar and small for both majors. Considering
that the average terminal GPA of graduates in my sample is 3.38 for STEM and 3.15 for non-
STEM, conditional on the same sector-specific endowment, there would be an observed log-wage
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Table 1.5: Unskilled Labor Market Parameter Estimates by Dropout Year
Years 2/3 Year 4
Wage Coefficients
Constant 2.2395 (.0628) 2.0520 (.0760)
Exp .1897 (.0540)
Exp2 × 100 -1.2579 (.9001)
At Least One Exp. .0775 (.1054) .4973 (.1169)
Productivity Shock Var. .2263 (.0067)
Nonpecuniary Flows
Constant .3074 (.2169) -.0278 (.1834)
No Prior Exp. -.1060 (.2315)
Switching Cost if HP
1.7450 (.1860) 2.7033 (.3336)
in Prior Period
Note: Wage coefficients are reported in log-units of yearly thousands of dollars. Bootstrap standard
errors are in parentheses.
premium of −0.357 + 0.195 × 3.38 − 0.003 × 3.15 = 0.293 for the average STEM major vs
the average non-STEM major in their first year of work, if they worked in a STEM affiliated
sector, and corresponding ‘STEM-major premia’ of -0.240 and -0.216 log-units for working in the
HSS and unaffiliated sectors. To compare these values to other results in the literature, consider the
conclusion of Kinsler and Pavan (2015) when analyzing the Baccalureate and Beyond that ‘science
majors working in jobs unrelated to their field of study earn approximately 30 percent lower wages
than those working in related jobs’. An analogous calculation regarding relatedness in my model
involves comparing the expected log-wages of all simulated individuals that obtain a degree in
STEM (i.e., knowing their final GPA as well as well as their unobserved type) and comparing their
expected log-earnings in the STEM occupation (i.e., related) vs. the other two occupations. I find
that there is an average 0.67 log-wage premium for STEM degree holders in STEM occupations
over HSS occupations, and a 0.76 premium over unaffiliated occupations; these are significantly
larger than the estimates of Kinsler and Pavan.24
24This difference may be due to ‘relatedness’ being more narrowly defined in Kinsler and Pavan (2015) than in my
case: they observe workers with the same occupation and major but with differing relatedness of job to field of study,
and their reduced-form returns to relatedness are lower after controlling for occupation.
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Considering the yearly nonpecuniary payoffs for each occupation, the unaffiliated skilled sec-
tor has the lowest nonpecuniary cost relative to home production, ranging from the yearly dollar
equivalent of 0.500/0.045 = $11, 100 for type 1 to $17, 900 for type 3. Across types, relative to
leisure, skilled workers have a nonpecuniary cost of work for each ‘matching’ sector ranging from
$17, 900 to $24, 400. Entry costs are also significant: the additional cost of entering a sector in
which one has no experience may be as high as the equivalent of $18, 900 for STEM occupation.
There are also significant switching costs if one did not work in the occupation in the previous pe-
riod, which are as large as $59, 300 for switching into the STEM affiliated sector. However, since
a $50, 000 equivalent corresponds to a difference in per-period flow utilities of 50 × 0.45 = 2.25;
if the three other alternatives had the same utility at 2.25 lower, the probability of choosing any of
those three alternatives is still 24 percent.25
Regarding the unskilled labor market parameters, the levels of initial yearly earnings are sig-
nificantly lower than for college graduates. The initial yearly returns to experience are about twice
as large as for skilled workers, at 0.190; however, the returns quickly diminish, with the experience
profile flattening after 8 years. The nonpecuniary payoffs to each occupation are less negative in
magnitude compared to those for skilled occupations, and the switching costs into work are of a
similar magnitude to those for skilled occupations.
Goodness of Fit
To assess model fit in the skilled labor market, I simulate individual decisions and outcomes
according to my model and compare my simulations to the data. I take the sample of college
graduates with at least one labor market observation and their terminal major, GPA, and school
quality as given, and calculate for each individual their model-estimated posterior probability of
being a particular unobserved type θn given their observed choices and wages. Using these posteri-
ors probabilities, for each individual I perform 25 draws of their unobserved type (4050 simulated
lifetimes over 162 individuals), and then simulate their shocks and decisions, taking the unobserved
25From the logit formula for choice probabilities: exp (2.25)/(exp (2.25) + 3× exp (0)) = 0.76
28
Table 1.6: Yearly Occupational Transition Matrix for College Graduates
Occ. Choice (t)
Occ. Choice (t− 1) HP STEM Aff. HSS Aff. Unaff.
Home Prod.
Actual 11.9 6.8 44.1 37.3
Sim 17.0 14.1 39.8 29.1
STEM Aff.
Actual 0.6 91.9 4.7 2.9
Sim 1.2 89.5 5.1 4.3
HSS Aff.
Actual 2.9 2.5 86.7 7.9
Sim 2.3 3.3 85.5 8.9
Unaff.
Actual 2.1 3.6 9.3 85.0
Sim 2.5 2.9 10.0 84.6
Note: Results are for up to 8 years after college. Values reported in %. Rows sum to 100%.
type as given.26 For the unskilled market, I consider all 6 possible outcomes for the individual’s
endowment post-dropout, weighted by their frequency of occurrence in the data (time of dropout
at t = 2, 3, 4 with the decision to engage in home production or work in the unskilled labor market
sector at the time of dropout), and make 25 draws per individual, for a total of 2750 simulated
lifetimes over 110 individuals.
I use similar criteria of goodness of fit to those used in Keane and Wolpin (1997). The first
is the aggregated year-to-year transition rate between occupational choices for college graduates,
shown in Table 1.6. The simulated model does a good job of replicating the persistence of year-to-
year choices in the data (the diagonal values), as well as occupation-to-occupation transition rates;
although it mispredicts transitions out of home production into the STEM and unaffiliated sectors.
The corresponding transition matrix for the unskilled sector is provided in Table 1.7; the model
does a good job of replicating the transition probabilities among college dropouts.
The second measure of goodness of fit is the evolution of occupational choice probabilities
over time. These results are given in Table 1.8 for the skilled sector and Table 1.9 for the unskilled
sector.27 For the skilled sector, yearly choice probabilities quickly stabilize from year-to-year by
26I focus on the subset of individuals with observed skilled labor outcomes, effectively ‘matching’ graduates on
labor market-relevant observable characteristics (major, GPA, college quality), instead of fully simulating the model,
since the distribution of simulated graduates differs from the observed distribution, due to randomness and model
error, as well as attrition from the data.
27The drop in choice probabilities for the STEM sector past year 6 in the data is partially a result of workers in
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Table 1.7: Yearly Employment Transition Matrix for College Dropouts
Choice (t)







Note: Results are for up to 12 years after start of college. Values reported in %. Rows sum to
100%.
Table 1.8: Occupational Choice Probabilities for College Graduates, by Years Since Graduation
Data Simulated
Time HP STEM HSS Unaff. HP STEM HSS Unaff.
1 25.9 13.6 22.2 38.3 30.0 10.4 25.6 34.0
2 6.3 17.0 32.1 44.7 7.9 15.8 39.1 37.2
3 4.5 18.5 31.8 45.2 4.8 18.0 41.5 35.7
4 1.3 21.1 40.1 37.5 3.3 19.4 42.8 34.5
5 2.8 23.4 37.2 36.6 3.0 20.0 42.7 34.3
6 0.8 20.6 39.7 38.9 2.1 20.4 41.9 35.6
7 1.0 19.8 38.6 40.6 1.5 20.3 42.4 35.8
8 1.7 16.9 40.7 40.7 1.4 21.5 39.5 37.7
9 0.0 17.1 42.9 40.0 1.3 21.4 37.1 40.2
Note: Time is years since graduation. Probabilities are in %.
years 4-5; a similar result is present in the simulated data. Importantly, the simulated choice
probabilities of home production closely track that of the data, suggesting that my choice of γp =
0.045 and β = 0.9 is a reasonable one. For the unskilled sector, the simulated choice probabilities
closely match that of the data after year four, which suggests that there may be additional dynamics
during the first one or two years of dropout from college that I am not capturing.
To assess the goodness of fit of the wage profile, I plot the mean observed wages over time
since graduation, varying the grouping by major, occupation, or whether or not their GPA fell
above or below the median observed GPA for their major (3.43 for STEM, 3.16 for non-STEM).28
STEM occupations becoming ‘managers’, which are difficult to classify.
28I do this instead of comparing reduced form wage regression results as in Keane and Wolpin (1997) because of the
small sample size, particularly in ‘mis-matched’ major and occupation combinations, such as STEM majors working
in HSS occupations.
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Table 1.9: Occupational Choice Probabilities for All Dropouts, by Time
Data Simulated
Time HP Unskilled HP Unskilled
3 23.8 76.2 31.2 68.8
4 12.7 87.3 20.9 79.1
5 14.1 85.9 17.8 82.2
6 15.4 84.6 11.6 88.4
7 7.7 92.3 9.6 90.4
8 7.1 92.9 8.1 91.9
9 6.4 93.6 8.3 91.7
10 7.8 92.2 7.7 92.3
11 10.0 90.0 7.9 92.1
12 15.4 84.6 8.1 91.9
Note: Earliest time shown is t = 3 since at t = 2, every student in the constructed sample has the
option of education as well as dropout.
The graphical results for college graduates working in the skilled sector are shown in Figs. 1.1
and 1.2. Two other slices of the data, including by all three of terminal major, GPA, and sector,
are given in the Appendix (Figs. A.1,A.2). For the unskilled sector, I split the data by the year of
dropout; the results are shown in Fig. 1.3.
Overall, the simulated wages for college graduates track the actual data fairly well, and the
data generally support the operating assumption of the model that, in general, higher grades are
associated with higher wages. For college dropouts, the wage profile also fits the data fairly well.
It is also apparent from the data that there is a significant difference in accepted wages for students
who drop out or fail out in their fourth year, justifying the additional term in the model’s functional
form specification.
Lastly, I perform an out of sample examination of goodness of fit of the model on the graduates
with valid labor market data but missing education data, which were excluded from the estimation.
I fix all of the labor market parameters except for the type proportions, calculate the posterior
probabilities that those individuals are of a given type, and find the population type proportions for
the out-sample such that the average of the posterior probabilities over individuals is sufficiently
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Figure 1.1: Wage Profile for College Graduates, by Major and GPA
Figure 1.2: Wage Profile for College Graduates, by Major and Occupational Sector
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Figure 1.3: Wage Profile for College Dropouts, by Year of Dropout
close to the population proportion.29 The simulation results are given in greater detail in Appendix
D, but the summary is that the choice probabilities, transitions, and most of the wage profile are
well-replicated; with the exception of wages for non-STEM majors that work in HSS occupations,
which are overpredicted by the model, and the wage profile for STEM majors that work in STEM,
which is less steep in the model versus the out of sample data. These findings are driven by
fundamental differences in the two datasets.30
Occupational Sorting
One thing to consider in the model is the degree of sorting into occupation by unobserved type.
If, for example, it turned out that type 1 individuals always worked in STEM occupations, and
conversely type 2 in HSS occupations, then since these types are modeled as predetermined at the
time of entry into college, any policy that influences the final distribution of STEM and non-STEM
29This is the analogue of the self-consistency condition in the E-M algorithm used to update the type proportions.
30For example, when comparing observed log-wages for non-STEM majors working in HSS between the two
datasets, the mean observed yearly earnings are between $6,000 to $10,000 lower year by year, for the out of sample
data, for the first 7 years after graduation.
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majors will have no effect on the resulting distribution of workers in STEM and HSS occupations:
the nonpecuniary preferences would override any changes in earnings across policies.
Since in my simulations, I know the unobserved type for that particular individual (computed
according to their posterior probabilities of being each type), I can calculate the distribution of
unobserved types across occupational choices over time.31 The results are shown in Fig. 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Type Distribution of Workers Over Time, by Occupational Choice and Major
With the exception of STEM majors working in STEM affiliated occupations, there is incom-
plete separation of agent types across occupational sectors: the probability that a worker in a given
major-occupation bin belongs to a given type belongs to the ‘matched’ type is at most 80 percent.
There is also evidence of numerous type 1 graduates with STEM degrees working in the unaf-
filiated sector shortly after graduation, taking a ‘temporary’ job in the unaffiliated sector before
switching out later. Since agent types are modeled as being determined prior to college matricula-
tion, the sorting behavior by type suggests that policies in college that change student major choice
will have an effect on the distribution of occupational choices, although it will be tempered by an
31As before, I base my simulation on the sample of college students with at least one labor market outcome and
match on their observables.
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agent’s type.
Net Present Values of Degrees and Dropout
Using the labor market parameter estimates, I am able to calculate the net present values
(NPVs) of graduating with a college degree in STEM or non-STEM at various GPAs, through
backwards recursion from the terminal period. These NPVs are the expected values at the start
of time t = 5 for a college graduate, prior to realizing any wage or preference shocks (i.e. these
are the values that a student at t = 4 integrates over with respect to their uncertain final grades
to calculate the continuation value of their final year of college). I compare these values to the
conditional value of dropping out at year 4 and choosing home production in Table 1.10; these
values also include the nonpecuniary payoff for graduating from college, which is discussed in the
education section.32
Conditional on the same major and grade, attending an elite university confers a roughly 10 -
15 percent relative premium in NPV over a non-elite university. Within agent types attending the
same quality university and same major, a 1.0 increase in GPA from 3.0 to 4.0 results in a relative
increase in NPV of their degree by between 4.1 percent at the lowest (unaffiliated type with a
degree in STEM) to up to 19.9 percent at the largest (STEM type with a degree in STEM). These
percent changes in net present values are similar to the values of the corresponding grade returns
for those majors (e.g., 20.1 percent vs. 0.19 for type 1 majoring in STEM, or 4.5 percent vs. 0.03
for type 3 majoring in non-STEM).
The current period conditional value functions (i.e., the sum of the current period flow utility
plus the discounted expected future payoff) for dropping out of college are given at the bottom of
Table 1.10; these represent the ‘opportunity costs’ of continuing one’s college education instead of
dropping out and engaging in home production or unskilled labor. While the stylized facts involv-
ing lifetime earnings differences between college graduates and dropouts are very stark, the NPVs
accounting for nonpecuniary preferences for occupation are significantly closer in magnitude.
I also compare the net present values across majors but within types and university qualities,
32The conditional value of dropping out and choosing home production at time 4 is $298,700 in t = 5 dollar
equivalents. The nonpecuniary payout for obtaining a bachelor’s degree is equivalent to $10,500.
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and at similar grades: this represents the willingness of students to change majors. For example,
for type 1 individuals, the NPV of receiving a STEM degree actually falls below the NPV of a
non-STEM degree unless GPA is above a 3.0. For those types of students, if they expect to receive
relatively low grades (e.g., if their SAT scores and high school GPA are low), they are more likely
to switch into non-STEM. Comparing across GPA for the other two types of individuals, there is
a fairly consistent NPV premium for graduating with a degree in non-STEM relative to STEM, on
the order of 20 percent for type 2 and 30 percent for type 3. Given that the NPV’s between majors
‘cross’ for type 1, but not for the other two types, one would expect that a policy that altered the
grade distribution of STEM and non-STEM would have a fairly large impact on type 1 individuals,
and smaller effects on the other two types.
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Table 1.10: Relative Net Present Values of Graduation or Dropout by Agent Type, Major, GPA, and College Quality
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3








117.1 139.2 99.2 111.8 123.1 135.1
(4.8) (5.7) (4.6) (5.2) (9.4) (10.4)
3.0 42.7
127.2 152.4 102.3 116.8 125.6 137.9
(5.1) (6.2) (4.7) (5.6) (9.9) (11.0)
3.5 77.1
139.1 167.7 106.5 123.3 128.2 140.8
(5.6) (7.0) (4.9) (6.2) (10.5) (11.6)
4.0 100
153.1 185.2 112.2 131.3 130.9 143.9
(6.3) (8.0) (5.4) (7.1) (11.1) (12.3)
Non-STEM
2.5 2.3
124.4 142.1 119.2 135.3 153.3 168.3
(4.3) (4.9) (4.1) (4.6) (6.6) (7.6)
3.0 13.9
126.4 144.6 122.5 139.9 156.2 171.6
(4.3) (5.0) (4.2) (4.7) (6.5) (7.5)
3.5 55.8
128.7 147.5 126.2 144.8 159.3 175.1
(4.2) (5.1) (4.2) (4.8) (6.4) (7.4)
4.0 100
131.1 150.7 130.2 150.1 162.4 178.6






Conditional Value Functions (At Dropout)
Dropout Time HP Unskilled Labor
Year 2 119.0 (11.1) 121.4 (12.5)
Year 3 118.5 (11.1) 120.8 (12.5)
Year 4 100 (13.8) 100.8 (14.3)
Note: Values are % relative to the conditional value of dropping out in year 4 and choosing home production. Values in parentheses are the
standard deviations of the NPVs derived from each bootstrap estimate of the model parameters. GPA CDF is the percentage of graduates
in the data in that major with terminal GPA’s at or below that value.
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Unobserved heterogeneity is an important part of the model, as demonstrated by cross-type
differences in NPVs among college graduates. In terms of observable heterogeneity, I find that
within major, the standard deviation of terminal GPA is 0.41 (0.44) GPA units for STEM (non-
STEM); in terms of NPVs, this corresponds to as little as $5,600 for type 1 individuals with a
degree in non-STEM to $27,800 for type 1 individuals with a degree in STEM; for the other type-
major combinations, the values range between $6,600 to $9,300. To compare across types, the net-
present values of a type 1 graduate in STEM with an average grade (3.42) is $409,000 vs. $368,000
for type 2 in non-STEM with an average grade (3.13) or $468,000 for type 3 in non-STEM with
an average grade (3.13). These differences across types are much larger than the variation due
to differences in grades, although not as large as in previous studies such as Keane and Wolpin
(1997).33 One last thing to note is that while STEM occupations command higher salaries in the
data (see Fig. 1.2), the NPVs are generally highest for the type 3: this finding is primarily due
to the differences in nonpecuniary costs of working, and the fact that the nonpecuniary costs of
working are the lowest in the unaffiliated sector, across all types (Table 1.4).
1.6.2 Educational Sector
My estimates of the education parameters are given in Table 1.11. Even after standardizing,
high school GPA has larger effects on college grades than either of the two SAT score compo-
nents.34 Grading standards by major are generally more consistent over time at elite universities
versus non-elite: for example, the difference between the expected grades of the same student tak-
ing STEM in years 4 and 1 is 0.47 for non-elite, but 0.21 for elite. Elite universities also generally
have lower variance in the grades that students receive after controlling for unobserved type and
observable characteristics. Across the types of individuals, there is evidence of differences in aca-
demic ability as measured by grades but not explained by SAT and HS GPA. Type 2 individuals
are expected to perform roughly 0.33 GPA points worse in STEM courses than the excluded type
33Keane and Wolpin (1997) found that between-type variation of NPVs made up roughly 90 percent of their total
variation.
34In my sample, the standard deviations are 0.479, 101.9, and 92.9 for HS GPA, SAT Math, and SAT Verbal,
respectively.
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Table 1.11: Estimated Education Parameters, by Major
STEM Non-STEM
Non-Elite Elite Non-Elite Elite
Grade Coefficients
SAT Math/100 .1000 (.0314) .0521 (.0302)
SAT Verbal/100 .1832 (.0328) .1075 (.0316)
HS GPA .3720 (.0501) .4178 (.0457)
Year 1 .0974 (.1385) .1553 (.1691) .6681 (.0773) .7839 (.1099)
Year 2 .2766 (.1167) .1485 (.1243) .6310 (.0763) .8673 (.0817)
Year 3 .3681 (.1019) .3919 (.1206) .7034 (.0682) .6379 (.1110)
Year 4 .5680 (.1151) .3647 (.1429) .8884 (.0686) .8078 (.1100)
Type 2− Type 1 Abil. -.3270 (.0447) .1312 (.0328)
Type 3− Type 1 Abil. -.0923 (.0305) -.1894 (.0306)
Grade Shk. σ2, t = 1, 2 .5263 (.0576) .4220 (.0608) .4673 (.0335) .1187 (.0249)
Grade Shk. σ2, t = 3, 4 .3233 (.0210) .1669 (.0122) .3092 (.0679) .5236 (.0221)
Nonpecuniary Flows
Type 1 1.2078 (.2373) 1.2266 (.2064)
Type 2 1.0734 (.2520) 1.5242 (.1677)
Type 3 .6204 (.2798) .6705 (.1660)
Priv. Non-Rel.− Public .2978 (.1397) .5027 (.1137)
Priv. Rel.− Public .0204 (.1598) 1.070 (.1464)
For Profit− Public -.5664 (.1710) .0646 (.1056)
Switch. Cost into Major .6917 (.0787) 1.8723 (.1129)
Graduation Payoff .4742 (.1718)
Type Proportions
Type 1 (π1) .294 (.028)
Type 2 (π2) .451 (.029)
Type 3 (π3) .255 (.024)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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1individuals, and also 0.13 GPA points better in non-STEM. Type 3 individuals are expected to per-
form slightly worse than type 1 individuals in both STEM (0.09) and non-STEM (0.19) courses.
Nonpecuniary preferences for major are fairly similar for type 1 and 2 agents, and lower for type
3. Across university types, there are also differences in the nonpecuniary payoffs for major, most
notable being the large premium for non-STEM majors at private religious universities relative to
public universities (the equivalent of $23,800 per year), which is reflected in the high proportion
of majors from those university types graduating in non-STEM (see Table 1.12 in the following
goodness of fit section). The nonpecuniary payoff to graduating and receiving a degree is the dollar
equivalent of $10,500 in the year following graduation (t = 5).35
Lastly, I estimate the distribution of unobserved types of students in my sample that attend at
least one year of four-year college; roughly half of the students are type 2, with a quarter each
being type 1 or 3. When considering the agents in my sample with labor observations, I find the
posterior distribution of types after the first year of college to be roughly 30 percent type 1, 45
percent type 2, and 25 percent type 3.
Goodness of Fit
As with the labor market, I simulate individual decisions by calculating the posterior probabil-
ity that an individual is of a given unobserved type given their choices, but using the sample of all
individuals at t = 1, rather than just workers for the labor market. For each individual, I perform
15 draws of their unobserved type and simulate their decisions and outcomes.
The first measure of goodness of fit is the set of overall graduation rates, split by university
type; the results are shown in Table 1.12. The model does a good job of replicating the overall
graduation rates in each major by university type, although it underpredicts the choice frequency of
non-STEM majors in private religious universities and dramatically overstates the graduation rate
for for-profit universities.36 This finding is likely because for-profit universities are fundamentally
different from not-for-profit universities both during college itself and also on the labor market; for
35One interpretation is the ‘warm glow’ feeling of accomplishment for completing a degree.
36Overall, the effect of this on my broader conclusions is minor, since only 5 percent of my sample attends a
for-profit university.
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Table 1.12: Graduation Rate by University Type
Public Priv. Non-Relig. Priv. Relig. For-Profit
Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim
% Graduate in STEM 17.5 16.3 12.2 13.4 2.4 5.6 6.3 1.9
% Graduate in non-STEM 45.0 51.3 59.2 62.7 87.8 82.0 12.5 45.3
Overall Grad Rate 62.5 67.6 71.4 76.0 90.2 87.6 18.8 47.2
Note: Values are shown in %.
Table 1.13: Choice Probabilities Among Students Still in College
STEM Non-STEM Unskilled HP
Time Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim
1 24.2 24.2 75.8 75.8
2 20.7 25.3 63.6 64.2 9.5 7.0 6.2 3.5
3 19.1 16.3 68.4 71.6 8.2 7.9 4.3 4.2
4 19.3 17.4 71.0 72.8 6.2 6.7 3.1 3.0
Note: Values are shown in %.
example, the observed wages of the graduates of for-profit universities are on average 0.37 - 0.55
log-units lower when compared to graduates from other non-elite university types. I also compute
the choice probabilities among students who have not dropped out; the results are given in Table
1.13; the model does a good job of matching the yearly choice probabilities.
Given that a key goal of the model is to replicate the selection process into major and attrition,
I track the average of the observed covariates as well as the ‘endogenous’ grade outcome, by
the major choices made by students over time. The results are presented in Table 1.14. The model
qualitatively replicates the upward trend in pre-college characteristics as well as the realized grades
of persisters.
It has been noted in Arcidiacono et al. (2016) with the NLSY97 and Chen (2013) with the
BPS:04/09 that the current-period grades of students who persist in the next period are higher
than the current-period grades of students who switch majors or drop out in the next period. This
observation is also present in my estimating sample, and I show the correlations between the t+ 1
period decision and t grade in Table 1.15. While the model qualitatively replicates the higher
grades for persisters versus dropouts, it underestates the degree of separation in current-period
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Table 1.14: Average SAT/HS GPA and Grade Outcomes of Students, by Major Choice and Time
Major Time
SAT Math SAT Verbal HS GPA Grade Grade SD
Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim Data Sim
STEM
1 597 597 557 557 3.30 3.30 2.78 2.78 .96 .96
2 613 589 570 559 3.40 3.31 3.13 2.99 .77 .62
3 625 612 569 574 3.46 3.42 3.23 3.29 .81 .48
4 644 618 583 579 3.54 3.45 3.45 3.45 .43 .43
Non-STEM
1 556 556 548 548 3.18 3.18 2.86 2.86 .83 .83
2 569 562 560 551 3.24 3.20 2.91 2.88 .70 .55
3 582 566 571 554 3.31 3.22 3.02 2.93 .65 .45
4 586 570 573 557 3.36 3.24 3.21 3.10 .60 .46
Table 1.15: Average Grade Outcome by Current Period Decision and Next Period Decision
Data Simulated
Period t+ 1 Choice
Period t Major t School SD Dropout SD School SD Dropout SD
1 3.02 (.80) 1.92 (1.05) 2.85 (.94) 2.40 (.95)
STEM 2 3.27 (.60) 2.02 (1.09) 3.07 (.59) 2.63 (.65)
3 3.31 (.67) 2.63 (1.42) 3.34 (.46) 2.69 (.50)
1 3.03 (.66) 1.91 (1.06) 2.90 (.80) 2.45 (1.03)
Non-STEM 2 3.03 (.57) 2.06 (.84) 2.90 (.54) 2.70 (.60)
3 3.09 (.56) 2.42 (1.04) 2.93 (.45) 2.90 (.46)
Note: Values shown are the average grades received in period t for a student who makes a particular
choice at t and t+ 1.
academic performance between the two student groups: in particular, it predicts that the average
college dropout in the first two years receives grades around 2.5 whereas in the data, the average
dropout receives grades around 2.0.
I also compare the performance of students in their first year of school and their final educa-
tional outcome: graduating in either STEM or non-STEM or dropping out from college. Chen
(2013) observed that of the students who start out in STEM in their first year, those who eventually
switch to non-STEM or drop out have lower grades than those that persist. The results are shown
in Table 1.16. The data clearly show a separation in the average first-year performance of students
by their eventual college outcome, following the hierarchy of STEM - non-STEM - dropout; this
finding is qualitatively replicated in the simulated data, but to a lesser degree of separation.
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Table 1.16: Average Grade in First Year, by Major Choice and Eventual College Outcome
t = 1 Major Final Coll. Outcome
Data Simulated
Mean t = 1 Grade SD Mean t = 1 Grade SD
Grad STEM 3.51 (.44) 3.33 (.71)
STEM Grad Non-STEM 2.77 (.65) 2.63 (.84)
Dropout 2.14 (.96) 2.35 (1.00)
Grad STEM 3.46 (.36) 3.17 (.70)
Non-STEM Grad Non-STEM 2.96 (.55) 3.03 (.74)
Dropout 2.25 (.99) 2.55 (.97)
Note: Values are the average grade received in the first year, split by first year choice and eventual
outcome.
Discussion
Taken as a whole, the educational model is able to replicate the aggregate dropout behavior that
is observed in the data, but it understates the degree of separation along academic performance
characteristics between students who persist and those that drop out. In the data, students who
persist in college are much stronger academically, both in terms of high school characteristics and
observed college grades, than those that drop out. My model understates this selection on academic
ability, but since it still generates the same aggregate outcomes, it suggests that my model actually
overstates the impact of grade shocks on eventual outcomes. This is made especially clear if one
looks at the association between model-generated grade shocks and a student’s eventual outcomes,
as seen in Table 1.17. On average, a negative yearly grade shock on the order of 0.05 separates
students who persist vs. students who drop out.37 When compared to the estimated standard
deviations of yearly grades (0.12 at the smallest, to 0.53 at the largest), this finding shows that in
my model, even relatively minor grade shocks can induce dropout behavior.
One possible explanation for this lack of separation in the model lies in the modeling assump-
tion that agents have rational expectations and are aware of all of the parameters in the grade
generating process. There is evidence in the literature that students are over-optimistic about their
37Since my estimating sample only contains students who attend at least one year of college, I do not simulate any
grade shocks for year 1 students.
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Table 1.17: Mean Model-Generated Grade Shock and t+ 1 Choice
Period t+ 1 Choice
Period t Major t School SD Dropout SD
STEM
2 -.004 (.461) -.083 (.524)
3 .021 (.289) -.040 (.310)
Non-STEM
2 -.014 (.421) -.066 (.477)
3 -.008 (.342) -.013 (.303)
Note: Values are the average simulated grade shock associated with the periods t and t+1 choices.
performance in college at the time of college entry (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2013; Arcidi-
acono et al. 2011). This misjudging of academic performance would have to persist past the first
year of college, since in the data the students who drop out after the first year perform much worse
than would be predicted under my model, which assumes rational expectations (i.e. the students
know the parameters in the grade generating process).
A second possibility is the presence of variation in nonpecuniary preferences that is correlated
with grades, either in the outcomes at the time of graduation or during college itself. An example
of the former would be students with higher grades not only receiving jobs that pay more, as
is modeled, but also enjoying their jobs more in nonpecuniary terms (maybe they receive more
desirable jobs within the sector); these preferences would be difficult to identify as the relative
preference for money γp is primarily identified off of the changing proportions of work and home
production as wages increase.
However, for the latter, it is possible that something that is correlated with grades also posi-
tively affects the consumption value (or reduces the psychic cost) of education. This effect would
have to be in addition to the differences in preferences for major by unobserved type; perhaps
directly related to observable characteristics such as SAT scores or high school GPA. One possi-
ble mechanism would be ‘effort’: academically strong students may find it easier (and hence less
psychically costly) to obtain their grades, which I treat as exogenous conditional on type and ob-
servables.38 The issue is that effort is unobserved and so this may end up confounding the grade
38See e.g. Arcidiacono et al. 2016 where ‘expected ability’ shows up in the flow utility of education as an ‘inverse
proxy of effort’.
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returns and consumption value of college: both of these mechanisms would generate a positive
correlation between academic ability and persistence in college. Similarly, allowing grades to
affect the consumption value of college muddies the identification of unobserved ability versus
unobserved preference for major, since now both would affect the agent’s decisions over major.
1.7 Counterfactual Experiments
Using the structural parameter estimates, I conduct a number of counterfactual experiments.
Since I do not explicitly model the foundations for the returns to GPA in the labor market (e.g., if
they are the result of a signaling equilibrium), these counterfactuals must be considered in a par-
tial equilibrium setting, such as if one relatively small university changed their grading policies.
Otherwise, it is likely that the relevant GPA and major returns would change if many universities
changed their grading standards and significantly altered the composition of their graduates. Like-
wise, large changes to grading policies would affect the ex-ante value of attending the university,
thus affecting the composition of students who apply to, are accepted by, and ultimately matricu-
late to universities;these components are taken as fixed in my counterfactuals.39 That said, there is
evidence in the literature that even when made aware of the differences in grading standards across
different universities, employers still exhibit correspondence bias and fail to account for especially
lenient or stringent grading standards (Swift et al., 2013). Thus, the results of the grade counter-
factuals should be thought of as fairly minor changes in grading policies that are understood by
students and faculty at the university; but not by students considering attending the university.
All of these counterfactuals are conducted in two steps: first, using the estimates of the struc-
tural parameters, for each individual in the sample and all of their observed choices and outcomes,
calculate their posterior probability of being each of the unobserved types θn. Randomly sample
their unobserved type according to their posterior type distribution, then simulate their decisions
and outcomes using the new counterfactual parameter values, taking their first year grades, observ-
able high school characteristics, and unobserved type as given.
39For an example at an admittedly narrow margin, according to the Dean of Admissions at Princeton University,
after the university implemented its much-publicized grade deflation policy, ‘students at other schools (e.g., Harvard,
Stanford, and Yale) used [Princeton’s] grade deflation policy to recruit against [the university] Princeton University
Ad Hoc Committee (2014)’.
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Table 1.18: Effect of a 0.10 Log-Wage STEM Major Return Increase on Education and Labor
Outcomes
Baseline
STEM Premium STEM Premium
STEM Sector All Sectors
Graduation Rate (%) 70.6 73.2 74.1
STEM Graduation Rate (%) 13.6 18.9 23.4
Prop. of Grads in STEM (%) 19.3 25.8 31.6
% STEM Grads Type 1 89.5 91.8 80.3
% STEM Grads Type 2 3.7 3.7 7.4
% STEM Grads Type 3 6.8 4.5 12.3
STEM Workers, Yr. 1 7.26 9.11 9.91
STEM Workers, Yr. 3 11.89 15.48 15.99
STEM Workers, Yr. 5 13.28 17.20 17.09
STEM Workers, Yr. 7 13.65 17.88 18.35
Note: STEM worker values are percentages relative to the number of initial students in college,
which is fixed across baseline and counterfactuals.
1.7.1 Changes in the STEM Return on the Labor Market
To relate my model to the larger literature on the relationship between major choice and earn-
ings (e.g., Beffy et al. 2012; Long et al. 2015), I run a counterfactual where I increase the returns
afforded to STEM majors, either in all sectors or just the STEM affiliated sector, and see how the
higher returns change a variety of educational and labor outcomes.40 I do so by increasing rjM (the
log-return to STEM) by 0.1, either for all sectors j or just the STEM sector j = 1. This counterfac-
tual must be interpreted with caution since an observed permanent increase in STEM returns likely
reflects a broader change in labor market primitives, and is expected to have equilibrium effects on
all returns in the market. The results are given in Table 1.18.
A permanent increase in the return to a STEM major for the STEM affiliated sector results in a
modest increase in the overall college graduation rate from 70.6 percent to 73.2 percent, but a fairly
sizeable shift in the composition of graduating majors; the proportion of students who eventually
graduate with a STEM major increases by 39 percent in relative terms, from 13.6 percent to 18.9
percent of all students who attend at least one year. The overall composition of STEM majors by
40It should be noted that to an educational policymaker, this policy is difficult to implement.
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unobserved type does not change significantly under this counterfactual, with roughly 90 percent
of the graduates being type 1 types. However, this large increase in the number of STEM majors
is not matched one-to-one in the number of STEM workers: STEM workers as a percentage of
entering college students are predicted to relatively increase by approx. 30 percent across all years
(e.g., at 5 years post-graduation, from 13.28 to 17.20).
An increase to STEM returns across all occupational sectors is predicted to increase the over-
all graduation rate further to 74.1 percent, and the total number of STEM majors by 72 percent
relative to baseline. Furthermore, there is now a larger shift in the type composition of STEM
majors, with only 80 percent of STEM majors being type 1 and both of the other types having their
relative representation among STEM majors nearly double. However, while the relative increase
in total STEM majors is nearly double (72 percent vs. 39 percent) that of a STEM occupation only
premium, the number of STEM workers only increases slightly over the STEM occupation only
premium (31 percent vs. 28 percent at 7 years out). The proportional increase in STEM majors is
not fully reflected in an increase in STEM workers.
It should be noted that my modeled elasticity of STEM majors with respect to a STEM return
increase is very large, at ((18.9− 13.6)/13.6)/0.1 = 3.9. This elasticity contrasts sharply with the
estimate of Beffy et al. (2012) of around 0.1, or Long et al. (2015) of 0.67, and suggests that my
model of linear utility in wages may be overly sensitive to changes in wages: preferences are more
likely concave in wages.
1.7.2 Changing Grading Policies and Major-Specific Subsidies
Grade deflation policies either seek to counteract the tendency for grades to increase over time
across cohorts (rather than across years within the same cohort, i.e. as a student progresses from
freshman to senior), or to normalize the grades that students receive across different majors. Typi-
cally, non-STEM courses are found to have easier grading standards (Butcher et al., 2014; Johnson,
2006; Arcidiacono et al., 2012).41 In particular, I base my counterfactuals on the assumption that
41Table 1 of the Online Appendix to Butcher et al. (2014) shows the average grade in introductory humanities at
Wellesley College exceeds that in introductory science by 0.33. Johnson (2006) estimates STEM courses are graded
more stringently by 0.60 GPA points than non-STEM at Duke University by comparing grades received by students
within and outside of their major.
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grading standards are harder for STEM than non-STEM by 0.30, after controlling for high school
characteristics and agent type, based off of the observations of Arcidiacono et al. (2012).42
I perform three grading policy counterfactuals: 1) I deflate non-STEM grades by 0.30 by re-
ducing their yearly grade coefficients (λqjt) by 0.30; 2) I inflate STEM grades by 0.30; and 3) I
deflate non-STEM by 0.15 and inflate STEM by 0.15. These values are motivated by the discus-
sion in Arcidiacono et al. (2012) about grading differences between average grades in STEM and
non-STEM. Note that since I take year one outcomes as exogenous, I only adjust coefficients for
years 2 - 4. Finally, I perform a ‘budget-neutral’ major-specific tuition subsidy where, in each year
past the first, if a student chooses to take courses in STEM, they receive an additional financial
incentive in that period of $2, 200 and, if they choose non-STEM, they pay an additional $660 (i.e.,
differential tuition).43 The results of the counterfactual policies are given in Table 1.19.
The effects of these grading policies on the overall composition of graduates are smaller in
magnitude in comparison to the impact of a change in the returns to STEM in the labor market.
For the policy that adjusts non-STEM grades downwards, since it uniformly reduces the ‘value’
of college for all students by reducing grades and hence the expected payoffs at graduation, the
overall graduation rate falls by 3.4 percent relative to baseline. There is a substitution towards
STEM majors, such that the overall number of STEM majors actually increases slightly, by 1.4
percent relative to baseline, with a small and ambiguous effect on number of STEM workers. Con-
versely, the policy that adjusts STEM grades upwards uniformly increases the value of college for
all students, resulting in relatively more graduates by 3.9 percent; STEM graduates by 6.9 percent,
and STEM workers nine years out by 7.0 percent. Finally, the policy that adjusts both STEM and
non-STEM grades, and the differential tuition policy have similar effects on the absolute number
of STEM graduates (∼ 4.7 percent increase relative to baseline), but markedly different effects on
42In my dataset, after the first year of college, average yearly grades for STEM are actually higher than for non-
STEM (see Table 1.14). However, if I randomly assigned students still in college to STEM or non-STEM, by year, I
estimate that the average grade for students assigned to STEM is 0.05 lower than for non-STEM.
43In the data for years 2 - 4, I observe 528 choices of non-STEM majors versus 155 choices of STEM. I chose a
STEM subsidy of $2,200 because it gives a similar total graduation rate in STEM to the grade policy counterfactual
that adjusts both STEM and non-STEM.
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Table 1.19: Effects of Changes in Grading Policies on Education and Labor Outcomes
Baseline
Non-STEM STEM Both STEM
Deflate Inflate Grade Adj. Subsidy
Graduation Rate (%) 70.6 68.2 73.4 70.9 71.3
STEM Graduation Rate (%) 13.6 13.8 14.5 14.2 14.3
Prop. of Grads in STEM (%) 19.3 20.2 19.8 20.0 20.1
% STEM Grads Type 1 89.5 91.1 89.9 89.8 89.5
% STEM Grads Type 2 3.7 2.3 3.7 4.3 4.5
% STEM Grads Type 3 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.0 6.1
STEM Workers, Yr. 1 7.26 6.76 7.52 6.70 6.37
STEM Workers, Yr. 3 11.89 12.63 12.40 12.03 11.73
STEM Workers, Yr. 5 13.28 13.17 13.67 13.86 13.28
STEM Workers, Yr. 7 13.65 14.23 14.85 14.79 13.89
STEM Workers, Yr. 9 14.08 14.23 15.06 14.62 14.20
Note: STEM sector choice percentages are calculated relative to the number of students who attend at least
one year of college. ‘Both Grade Adj.’ refers to the policy that deflates non-STEM and inflates STEM
grades by 0.15 each. ‘STEM Subsidy’ refers to a yearly $2,200 tuition subsidy in STEM and $660 tuition
increase in non-STEM. All policies only affect years 2-4 of college.
the number of STEM workers. For example, the grading policy results in a 3.9 percent increase
in STEM workers nine years post-graduation for the grading policy vs. 0.9 percent for the tuition
subsidy. Note also that in general, the relative increase in STEM majors will exceed the relative
increase in STEM workers: some students will switch their major to STEM in light of incentives
such as tuition subsidies, but still end up working in other sectors. This finding is a consequence
of the persistent effects of grades on earnings after graduation, whereas tuition subsidies do not
directly affect earnings except through the student’s choice of major. Ultimately, the model pre-
dicts that changing grading standards can be just as effective as fairly sizeable tuition subsidies in
increasing the number of STEM majors, and possibly more effective at encouraging more workers
in STEM occupations, conditional on the same number of STEM majors.
The magnitude of the elasticity of major choice to grade deflation in the model is less than
the observed elasticity at Wellesley (Butcher et al., 2014)44, where the fraction of the class major-
ing in ‘science/math’ or economics increases from 28 percent pre-policy to 34 percent two years
44See Fig. 1 in their Online Appendix.
49
post-policy, or a 21.4 percent relative increase in STEM majors induced by an average reduction
in grades by 0.17 in treated departments; my counterfactual non-STEM deflation policy increases
the proportion of graduates in STEM from 19.3 percent to 20.2 percent for a 4.6 percent relative
increase over an average grade reduction in non-STEM by 0.3. However, it should be noted that
the grade deflation policies at Wellesley acted on first and second-year courses, while my coun-
terfactual treats the first year major choice and outcome as fixed. Given my estimates of sizeable
switching costs between majors, it is likely that my counterfactual experiments would understate
the impact of grading policy changes, especially if they change behavior of students in their first
year of college.
1.8 Conclusion
This research proposes a model of the labor market for college graduates where the grades a
student receives while in college are observed by employers and affect the wages he is offered.
This mechanism of having direct returns to grades is able to directly explain the observed negative
student responses to policies that lower grades, such as grade deflation policies: firms may not be
fully aware of the changes in grading policies and a student’s potential wage offers are lowered as a
result. I estimate a dynamic model of educational and occupational choice which incorporates this
mechanism, and find that it is able to replicate a number of other key stylized moments of the data,
such as the dropout decision from college, as well as the positive selection on academic ability for
students who stay in college.
Estimation results show that there are significant returns to grades in the labor market, with
the larger magnitudes of returns occuring when the major and occupational sector match (e.g. a
STEM major in a STEM occupation, or a non-STEM major in a HSS occupation). The matching
between major and occupation is not perfect: some STEM majors work in HSS occupations, and
vice versa, and the model is able to capture this behavior when considering simulated substitution
patterns between major and occupation under various counterfactual settings.
Counterfactual simulations show that there are substitution effects away from majors that
have their grading standards toughened (lowering the grades that students expect to receive), with
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smaller pass-through effects on occupational choices. A policy that adjusts both STEM and non-
STEM grading standards to be in line with each other results in comparable changes in student
choice behavior as a yearly tuition subsidy of $2, 200 towards STEM and $660 away from non-
STEM majors.
A few things remain unaddressed in the model. On the employer side, I do not model the ori-
gins of the returns to grades in the labor market. While in the context of grading policy changes
that affect a few universities a partial equilibrium analysis might be sufficient; in the case of broad
educational policies such as those considered by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology it is important to consider the general equilibrium effects, which requires under-
standing the underlying mechanisms that cause employers to use grades in hiring decisions or wage
offers. On the agent side, further work is needed to explain the sizeable switching costs between
majors (see Table 1.11) as well as the factors determining a student’s choice of college and initial
major. These initial college decisions are very important: in my sample, 67 percent of STEM grad-
uates chose STEM in their first year, and 91 percent of non-STEM graduates chose non-STEM.
A key area for further exploration is how these choices reflect a student’s underlying beliefs about
their potential outcomes in college and the labor force, so that the impact of educational policies





A.1 Tables and Figures Appendix
Table A.1: Major Classifications
Category Majors
STEM
Agriculture and Agriculture Operations, Natural Resources and
Conservation, Computer and Information Services, Engineering,
Engineering Technologies and Engineering-Related,
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Mathematics and Statistics,
Physical Sciences
Variable Liberal Arts and Sciences, General Studies and Humanities
Non-STEM All Other Majors
Note: Social sciences, including economics, are classified as non-STEM in this categorization.
Table A.2: Linear Estimation of SAT scores using ASVAB scores
SAT Math SAT Verbal HS GPA
Subject Category Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Constant 495 (2.78) 500 (2.63) 280 (0.76)
Arithmetic Reasoning 47.2 (4.84) 15.8 (4.55) 6.52 (1.51)
Assembling Objects 2.95 (3.35) -5.21 (3.15) 7.52 (1.07)
Auto Information -8.70 (3.29) -8.36 (3.11) -4.45 (0.99)
Electronics Information 0.44 (3.98) 8.71 (3.74) -6.70 (1.27)
General Science 11.6 (4.52) 35.4 (4.24) 3.97 (1.44)
Numerical Operations 5.52 (3.15) 3.78 (2.98) 1.59 (1.07)
Mathematics Knowledge 7.22 (5.02) -20.5 (4.74) 14.17 (1.56)
Mechanical Comprehension 11.4 (4.31) 0.85 (4.06) -0.82 (1.31)
Paragraph Comprehension -4.98 (4.27) 35.5 (4.05) 10.69 (1.35)
R2 0.269 0.281 0.264
Observations 2017 1983 4831
Note: All ASVAB scores are standardized to have mean zero and variance one. SAT scores remain
on the original 200-800 point scale, and high school GPA is in hundredths, i.e., a 400 is a perfect
GPA.
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Table A.3: Occupational Classifications
Skilled Sector Category Included Occupations
STEM Affiliated Skilled
Mathematics and Computer Scientists; Engineers,
Architects and Surveyors; Engineering and
Related Technicians; Physical Scientists; Economists;
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians;
Health Diagnosing and Treating Practitioners;




Lawyers, Judges, and Legal Support Workers;
Teachers; Education, Training, and Library Workers;
Media and Communication Workers; Other Managers
Unaffiliated Skilled
Counselors, Social and Religious Workers;
Protective Service Occupations; Agriculture Occupations;
Construction; Installation, Maintenance, and Repair
Workers; Setters, Operators and Tenders; Transportation;
Entertainers and Performers; Food Service;
Personal Care and Service; Sales;
Office and Administrative Support
Note: Manager occupations were assigned to an occupational sector consistent with industrial
codes and broadly consistent with prior occupational choices by individuals.
A.2 Data Appendix
Although the full NLSY97 sample contains approximately 8,984 individuals, I use the subset
of youths that have college transcript data from the Post-Secondary Transcript Study (PSTRAN)
part of the NLSY97. Out of the 4,399 youths who reported attending a postsecondary institution,
PSTRAN contains official transcripts for 3,818 (86.8 percent). Of these, I further restrict the data
to men who attend a four-year college (1046 men); I do not count men who attend community col-
leges or two-year colleges.1 The two main advantages of transcript data over student self-reported
results are the standardized classification of majors, and mitigation of the significant missing data
problem when using self-reported grades.2 I further restrict the sample in order to make it comply
1I use the NLSY97 Geocode Data’s associated IPEDS identifier and information to determine the type of college
attended. A four-year college is defined to a university where the highest degree offered is at least a bachelor’s. This
is distinct from PSTRAN’s reported degree being a bachelor’s, as many PSTRAN reported bachelor’s degrees were
obtained from community colleges.
2For example, in Arcidiacono et al. (2016), grades were missing for 28 percent of college students, and majors
were missing for 25 percent of four-year students, due to the fact that the interviews occurred primarily during the
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Figure A.1: Wage Profile for College Graduates, by Terminal Major, GPA, and Occupational Sec-
tor
with a model of graduating from college in four years; the details of this process are given in the
discussion of the educational sector.
A.2.1 Labor Market Sector Data Construction
The NLSY97 reports the weekly hours worked for an individual, the occupational sector they
were working in, and their yearly income. An individual is considered to be working full-time if he
is not in school and reports working at least 1040 hours for the year (20 hours a week).3 In the cases
where I use annual hours worked, I use their yearly reported salary to calculate wages, scaled to an
equivalent of 2087 hours worked over 52 weeks.4 For example, an individual who reports a yearly
income of $10,000 but reports working 1200 hours over 40 weeks would be scaled to a yearly
income of $10, 000 × (2087/1200) × (40/52) = $13, 380. Individuals without a college degree
work in the same ‘unskilled’ sector, regardless of their listed Standard Occupational Classification
school year, when grades were not yet realized. PSTRAN data was collected in 2012 - 2013, typically years after
courses were completed.
3Frequently, there are missing observations of weekly hours worked; I also count as working full-time individuals
that report working hours for at least 25 weeks in the year and that work on average 20 or more hours per week.
4The NLSY97 survey itself has calculated hourly wages, but I found these numbers to be very unreliable, e.g. with
very large variation year-to-year although the yearly income and hours worked were relatively constant.
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Figure A.2: Wage Profile for College Graduates, by Terminal GPA and Occupational Sector
code. Skilled workers are sorted into one of three occupational sectors according to Table A.3.
Wages are converted into annual earnings assuming 2087 work hours a year, deflated to 1996
dollars using the Historical CPI-U (calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics), and bottom- and
top-coded at the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent levels, at the 1996 equivalents of $3.22 and $48.41
per hour. Missing wages (with valid occupational choices) due to either missing yearly income or
hours worked data are left as ‘missing’ in my sample, and the missing wages are integrated over in
estimation.
Among college graduates, there is a high rate of receipt of advanced degrees: over 30 percent
of graduates from four year universities obtain at least a masters degree. I do not consider ad-
vanced degrees in my labor market estimation, so for individuals that report receiving a PhD or
professional degree (DDS, JD, MD), I drop all observations starting from four years prior to the
year of receipt of the degree, effectively dropping observations while in school for an advanced
degree and any labor market observations after obtaining the advanced degree.5 Additionally, I
drop observations classified as ‘home production’ for college graduates that report enrolling in a
5I do not drop masters degrees observations due to the observed wages not dramatically changing after receipt of
the degree, and a large number of individuals reporting working at least 20 hours a week while obtaining the degree.
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Table A.4: Characteristics of Students, by Highest Degree Obtained
Highest Degree Individs. % Elite Univ. % STEM Mean GPA GPA SD
Bachelor’s 125 14.4 16.8 3.12 (.45)
MS 50 22.0 24.0 3.20 (.43)
MS (Immed.) 4 0 0 3.37 (.27)
PhD 6 33.3 33.3 3.54 (.21)
PhD (Immed.) 1 100 100.0 3.29 N/A
Prof. Degree 4 75.0 50.0 3.44 (.63)
Prof. Degree (Immed.) 10 10.0 50.0 3.62 (.23)
Note: Advanced degrees are separated by whether the student immediately pursued an advanced
degree after graduating from college.
graduate degree for that year, and renumber their time periods accordingly.6
I have tabulated some of the characteristics of students that on to pursue various advanced
degrees in Table A.4. Students that complete PhDs or professional degrees are much likely to
attend an elite university and have a degree in STEM than those, and have higher average GPAs
than students with just a bachelor’s; student that complete a master’s degree fall in between.7
There do not appear to be systematic differences between students that pursue an advanced degree
immediately following graduation and those that work before pursuing the advanced degree. I also
examine the observed earnings for students in their first three years’ out of college, by their highest
degree and college major in Table A.5. Students that go on to pursue a higher degree generally
earn less in their jobs immediately out of college, after controlling for major, despite having higher
grades on average. Overall, students that pursue masters’ degrees are fairly similar to those that
just have bachelors’ degrees, but those that pursue a PhD or professional degree are not.
These statistics suggest that my sample, which excludes or truncates the observations of stu-
dents that pursue advanced degrees, may underestimate the financial returns to very high grades,
6For example, a student that attends graduate school at times t = 5, 6 and was classified as engaging in home
production at t = 5, 6, does not obtain a professional degree or PhD, and works in the STEM sector at t = 7, would
be recoded as working in the STEM sector at t = 5.
7Students that obtain professional degrees and PhDs also have higher average SAT scores and high school GPAs
(not shown).
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Table A.5: Average Yearly Earnings Within Three Years of Bachelor’s, by Highest Degree and
Major
Highest Degree/Major Wage Obs. Yearly Earnings
BA/STEM 49 30.2 (15.6)
MS/STEM 30 30.7 (12.2)
PhD/STEM 2 27.0 (16.8)
Prof./STEM 3 27.8 (3.0)
BA/Non-STEM 225 24.5 (14.4)
MS/Non-STEM 71 20.0 (10.0)
PhD/Non-STEM 6 13.3 (6.9)
Note: Values are given in thousands of dollars per year. Wage statistics do not include home
production choices (which would have zero earnings). The data had zero observations of Non-
STEM graduates that eventually pursued a professional degree.
although this depends on the underlying assumption about how students select into pursuing ad-
vanced degrees. For example, if students who pursue advanced degrees are more productive than
those that do not, dropping observations would bias downwards the financial returns to grades.
A similar downwards bias can occur if the students who pursue an advanced degree a few years
after their bachelor’s take jobs out of college that pay less but offer other amenities (such as vol-
unteer work, or reduced labor intensity, which may help these graduates’ applications to graduate
school).8 However, it is also possible that students pursue advanced degrees because of their com-
parative disadvantage in the types of jobs available to college graduates, and this is why they earn
less despite having higher grades. Lastly, given the high cost of pursuing an advanced degree, in
terms of time and foregone earnings, it is also likely that these students have different preferences
from the average college graduate, complicating discussions of welfare. Without further assump-
tions about the sorting into advanced degrees, the model cannot say very much about this margin
of students.
A.2.2 Educational Sector Data Construction
The PSTRAN transcript data contain information on the start and end of academic terms, the
courses taken in that term, and the grades received. I aggregate terms up to the level of academic
8There does not appear to a systematic difference in the occupational sector choices immediately following college
graduation, across advanced degrees.
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year, and map the academic year to the corresponding calendar year for the fall (e.g. Fall 1998
and Spring 1999 are classified as year 1998). If the student also worked in that period, I only
classify them as attending college; I ignore working while in college. If over half of those courses
taken in that year are in STEM, I assign the student’s choice to STEM; otherwise it is non-STEM.
For students who report multiple terminal majors, if any of the majors are STEM, I assign their
terminal major to STEM. My categorization of courses as STEM and non-STEM are similar to
that of Arcidiacono et al. (2016), and is given in Table A.1. The same classification system is
used when assigning majors to degrees received. Of note is that ∼ 70 percent of degrees (but not
individual courses) in my subsample are in the category of ‘Liberal Arts and Sciences, General
Studies and Humanities’, which I believe is a generic term that is neither STEM or non-STEM.
When categorizing degrees or courses in this category, I consider the student’s course composition
to assign STEM or non-STEM degrees.
Grades are computed by taking the simple average of the reported numeric term grades in each
academic year, if the term grades are directly reported. If term grades are not reported, I compute
the yearly GPA by taking the average grades over all of the courses the individual takes in the terms
in the academic year. It should be noted that in the cases where I have to compute the yearly grade,
I assign a different numeric grade for the course from the default numeric value. The NLSY97
automatically converts letter grades for courses to a GPA scale that I believe is non-standard (e.g.
the NLSY97 maps a B to a 2.857 instead of 3.0); it is straightforward to remap these grades to
other values. The original mapping as well as my adjusted mapping is given in Table A.6.9
For SAT scores and high school GPA, I use the highest reported SAT scores/reported high
school GPA if they are given; otherwise I predict these values from their computer-adaptive Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB) scores. I do not distinguish between predicted
and actual SAT scores/high school GPA in my analysis. I drop students with any missing data on
test scores/high school GPA (either directly stated or predicted from ASVAB scores), reducing my
9My adjusted mapping is better at predicting the reported numeric term GPA than the default mapping; the mean
difference between my calculated term average GPA and the transcript-reported GPA is 0.006 GPA points with a mean
absolute error of 0.109, versus a mean difference of -0.112 and mean absolute error of 0.185 using the NLSY97 values.
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Table A.6: Mapping Between NLSY97 Numeric Grades and Values Used in Paper













sample from 1046 to 943 men. The ASVAB measures the respondent’s skills in 12 separate topical
categories; I reduced the set of explanatory categories to those which have statistically significant
coefficients in a linear regression. The regression results are given in Table A.2.
To measure school quality, I use the IPEDS identifier from the NLSY97 Geocode Data, com-
bined with the U.S. News & World Report Best Colleges in 2001. Universities in the top 50 are
assigned a quality of Qi = 1; otherwise they are Qi = 0. 10 While the NLSY97 includes self-
reported information on the costs of tuition as well as scholarships, I found the reported tuition
values to be unreliable: a majority of the students reported receiving financial aid in excess of their
tuition. Instead, I calculated their yearly cost of tuition by combining the student’s reported college
attended with historical university-published tuition values collected by Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation (2018), deflated to 1996 dollars using the BLS ‘College tuition and fees’ index.11 Lastly, the
IPEDS directly reports the type of university the student attends (public, private religious, private
non-religious, and for-profit).
10The identities of the universities in the top 40-50 fluctuate somewhat from year to year, although the overall set of
the top 40 is relatively constant.
11I use the tuition for the last year the student attended the university, and assume it is constant for each of the four
prior years. Similarly, I take an average of the aid the student reports receiving over their years in college and apply it
in each year; thus the financial cost of college is constant per year. For public universities, I use their reported in-state
tuition values. I use the October value of the BLS index when deflating.
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A.2.3 Educational Sector Structural Restrictions
In my model, I imposed a number of structural restrictions on student choice as well as the time
to graduation. These are meant to capture in a simplified way the more complex decision problem
of deciding how many courses to take in a year and which courses to take, in light of institutional
requirements for graduation such as course pre-requisites, credit requirements, etc. A summary of
my construction of the estimation sample as well as some covariates are given in Table A.7.
1. Students can be modeled as graduating in 4 years and cannot re-enter college. This
is the largest restriction in terms of sample size. Of the 943 men with valid SAT scores
that are recorded as attending at least one year of college, 446 (47.3 percent) of them are
reported to have obtained a bachelors degree. Of these graduates, the number of years that
they reported taking courses is given in Table A.8. There is significant heterogeneity in
the number of years it takes a student to graduate, which is driven by variation in number
of courses taken.12 There is also likely significant stop-out and re-entry into college, as
reported by Arcidiacono et al. (2016) when using this dataset. Since I do not model the
intensive margin of course taking, and I wish to have deterministic graduation after 4 years
of school (assuming a passing GPA), I restrict the data on graduates to students who can be
‘represented’ as taking 4 years of college, i.e. that the educational decisions can be coerced
so that the student makes up to four educational decisions while in college. In the data,
there are 192 graduates that report going to college for 4 years over at most 5 calendar years.
For these individuals, I normalize their final year of college to be t = 4, and remove any
intermediate years they are not in college. I also include a further 14 individuals that attend
4 years of college, only counting years in which they take at least 6 courses over the year
(over at most 5 calendar years).
2. The major (STEM/non-STEM) for which the student receives a degree matches the
major choice at t = 4 as well as t = 3. This condition requires that the mapping of a
12The number of courses taken per year by these students is roughly normally distributed with mean 10, standard
deviation of 4.1.
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student’s major choice in a given year to STEM or non-STEM is ultimately consistent with
their terminal major. I code the year 3 and year 4 majors to coincide with the major for which
the student received a degree; I have to recode for 9 students. For students with degrees in
‘Liberal Arts and Sciences, General Studies and Humanities’, I code their terminal degree
by mapping students with more than half of their courses in years 3 and 4 in STEM fields
to ‘STEM’, and the rest to ‘non-STEM’. I do this for 96 students, or 48 percent of the 200
graduates in my 4-year subsample.
3. A student cannot graduate after their fourth year if their cumulative GPA is below 2.0.
This condition is consistent with what is observed for all graduates with transcript data, even
without subsetting for length of education. There are no transcripts in the data with reported
GPAs listed below 2.0.
4. To choose STEM at t = 3, a student must have chosen STEM at either t = 1 or t = 2.
This constraint was violated in 4 cases out of 47 students (8.5 percent) that were stated to
have majored in STEM at t = 3; those individuals were dropped from the sample.
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Table A.7: Estimation Sample Construction and Mean Covariates
Selection Criterion Persons Person × Years SAT M. SAT V. HS GPA Grad. Rate % Grads STEM
Full NLSY97 8,984 134,760
Drop females 4,599 68,985
Drop missing PSTRAN 1,741 26,115
Drop two-year/community college 1,046 15,690
Drop missing SAT/HS GPA and ASVAB 943 14,145 528 524 2.91 47.3% 12.8%
Drop inconsistent with 4 year graduation 350 5,250 537 531 2.98 58.3% 23.0%
Drop inconsistent years 3 and 4 choice or
306 4,590 564 550 3.20 62.8% 21.1%
STEM prerequisite
Drop pre-college and post-2011 obs. 306 3,000 564 550 3.20 62.8% 21.1%
Drop Adv. degree observations and
306 2,887 564 550 3.20 62.8% 21.1%
unclassifiable labor
Final Estimation Sample 306 2,887 564 550 3.20 62.8% 21.1%
Skilled Only Out-Sample 184 848 558 547 3.15 N/A 14.6%
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Table A.8: Total Years of Schooling for Male College Graduates with Transcripts in NLSY97








As can be seen from the covariates at each step of the data construction process, with the excep-
tion of the graduating percentage in STEM when subsetting for 4 year graduation, the covariates
are relatively stable with each subsequent subselection of the data.
I employed a similar method to construct the dropout sample from the population of students
with transcript data. Students who took at least 5 courses in the academic year were considered to
have attended school in that year, and were considered dropouts if their education was interrupted
and they never completed a degree later on (e.g., I exclude the sample of students who re-enter
school later on and complete their degree within the sample).
In my estimation, I do not use the observations of men that have valid terminal GPAs or majors
from their transcripts but incomplete or missing choices while in school; however, they are used
in the out of sample check of the validity of my labor market estimates (see the corresponding
section in the Appendix). The aggregate statistics for these individuals are given in Table A.7
as the ‘Skilled Only Out-Sample’. In my final estimation sample, I have 2,887 education and
labor market observations for 306 distinct men. Of these individuals, 37 initially attend an elite
university and 269 a non-elite; among graduates with at least one labor market observation, there
are 6 graduates in STEM and 28 graduates in non-STEM from elite universities, and 23 STEM
and 105 non-STEM graduates from non-elite universities. I have 1107 skilled labor market sector
observations (occupational choice and wages), 790 unskilled labor market sector observations, and
990 observations of educational sector choices (major choice and grade).
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A.3 Likelihood Expression and Simulation
Since the estimation method is full-solution, I must calculate the ex-ante value functions re-
cursively from the terminal period T . Knowing these value functions then allows me to determine
the relevant choice probabilities, which I combine with the wage likelihoods to obtain the full
likelihood contribution for each observation.
A.3.1 Ex-Ante Value Function
I assume that agents can work for up to 30 years after completing a 4-year degree; thus dropouts
can work for up to 33 years in the unskilled sector (recall that I subset the data for individuals who
attend at least one year of college). I calculate the ex-ante value function E[V (snit)], which is the
expectation of the value function given in Eqn. 1.14, integrated over the skilled/unskilled wage
shocks and preference shocks while in the labor sector; and the unskilled wage shocks, preference
shocks, and grade shocks while in the education sector. All of these ex-ante value functions will
depend on the agent’s unobserved type n; however they are treated as known in the M-step of the
E-M algorithm.
In the labor market, conditional on the various wage shocks εWit , the agent chooses the max-
imum of the sum of a Type I extreme value preference shock, a current period flow utility, and
a discounted future flow utility over various alternatives j; this expression admits the standard
log-sum-exponential form.13 Note that one of the options in Eqn. A.1 is home production, which
provides zero flow utility and zero income (WH = 0) in period t but still has a discounted contin-
uation value.
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i exp ai)+γEuler if εi are i.i.d. Type I extreme value and ai are constants, and γEuler
is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
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A similar expression exists for the educational sector, where the agent receives an unskilled
wage offer in each period. Since the agent receives his grades after his educational choice, he must
take an expectation over his grade outcomes (integrating over εGijt) in computing the discounted
continuation values for education E[V (sni,t+1)|snit, dit = j], j ∈ {N,S}.
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A.3.2 Individual Likelihood
Since I am using the E-M algorithm, I condition on the agent’s unobserved type n when com-
puting an agent’s likelihood contribution. Since the shocks that an individual faces are idiosyncratic
and not correlated across individuals, the total log-likelihood of the data is obtained by summing
the log-likelihoods over all individuals in the data. An individual’s decisions while in college and
in the labor market, as well as their observed grades if they attend school, or their observed yearly
wages if they work, all contribute to the individual’s log-likelihood, where the likelihood proba-
bilities are generated by the distributions of researcher-unobserved shocks, namely the preference
shocks εPijt, wage shocks ε
W




it is the history and predetermined state of
individual i at time t prior to observing any shocks, and it is assumed that with the exception of the
unobserved type n, all of the components of snit are observed by the researcher (i.e. the researcher
also observes the choice history and past grade outcomes). Ω is the full set of model parameters.
Labor Market Likelihood
Since agents observe wage shocks prior to their choice, I need to consider the joint likelihood
of the observed accepted wage as well as their occupational choice. For college graduates, a
sufficient statistic for their performance in college is their terminal major and GPA. Furthermore,
the researcher observes the agent’s experience profile, which is sufficient to determine the agent’s
expected log-wage offer in each sector. I can thus carry out the following per-period decomposition
for a sequence of individual’s labor market decisions {dlit}t∈T li , and the corresponding observed
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wages if they worked, given by {wit}t∈T li over the times they were in the skilled labor market T
l
i :
L(Ω; {dlit}t∈T li , {wit}t∈T li , {s
n









L(Ω; dlit|wit,wi,−j,t)dF (wi,−j,t|snit, wit)]×
L(Ω;wit|snit) (A.3)
where I decompose the joint likelihood of a given accepted log-wage and chosen labor market
sector into the likelihood of that particular wage observation in that sector, and the likelihood of
choosing that particular sector conditional on the agent’s experience profile and other researcher
observed state variables snit, integrated over the unobserved log-wage offers in the other sectors
wi,−j,t.
Consider an accepted log-wage observation at time t: (dlit = j
∗, wit = wij∗t), and define µj(snit)
to be the log-productivity in sector j as defined in Eqn. 1.1, net the idiosyncratic wage shock εWijt.
µj(s
n
it), up to the unobserved type-specific productivity shifter, is known exactly to the researcher.







(wij∗t − µj(snit))2} (A.4)
The choice likelihood contribution is an integral of logistic choice probabilities integrated over
the unobserved wages:
L(Ω; dlit|wij∗t, snit) =
∫
wi,−j,t
P{γp · exp(wij∗t) + γnijt + εPij∗t + βE[V (st+1i )|sti, dlit = j∗] >




where dF (wi,−j,t) is the distribution of log-wage shocks for other sectors −j. Since there is no
correlation across sectors in the wage shocks εWijt
14, the posterior distribution of wages over the un-
chosen skilled sectors is just the unconditional distribution of wages, i.e. they are all i.i.d. N(0, σ2j ).
Then the integrand is a logistic, given that εPijt is a Type I extreme value additive preference shock:
P ({γp ·Wij∗t + γnij∗t + εPij∗t + βE[V (sni,t+1)|snit, dlit = j∗] >
γp ·Wijt + γnijt + εPijt + βE[V (sni,t+1)|snit, dlit = j],∀j 6= j∗}
∩ {γp ·Wij∗t + γnij∗t + εPij∗t + βE[V (sni,t+1)|snit, dlit = j∗] > εPiHt + βE[V (sni,t+1|snit, dlit = H]})
=
exp(γp ·Wij∗t + γnij∗t + βE[V (sni,t+1)|snit, dlit = j∗])∑







j 6=j∗{exp(vj(snit, εWit )}+ exp(vH(snit))
(A.6)
where Wijt = exp(wijt) is the actual wage offer (rather than the log-wage offer), the final term in





it ) is the conditional value function, which is the current-period flow utility and discounted
expected future payoffs net the preference shock, and conditional on the state variables snit and the
wage shock εWit . The home production conditional value function does not depend on the wage
shock or agent type, since its flow utility does not depend on the current period’s wage shock, and
is normalized to zero for all types (net the preference shock).
If the individual were to choose home production while facing a set of outcomes from the
skilled sector, there would be no wage likelihood contribution as in Eqn. A.4, but an analagous
choice likelihood contribution.
For the case of the unskilled labor market, the wage likelihood contribution has the same nor-
mal form (with a different form of the log-productivity function µU(sit), where s is no longer
superscripted by n since there is no unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the unskilled labor
14Contrast this to Keane and Wolpin (1997), which has correlation across sectors. In my model, unobserved pref-
erence heterogeneity due to type will be difficult to separately identify from correlation in wage offers across sectors,
since the unaccepted wage offers are not observed.
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market), but with only one occupational sector. Finally, in the cases where there are missing data
on wages, but not on decisions, there is no wage likelihood contribution, but I integrate over all of
the wages to construct the choice likelihood contribution, replacing the integral in Eqn. A.6 from
over the posterior distribution of other wages wi,−j,t to one over all wages wit.
College Likelihood
Similar to the case with the labor market, I have to consider the joint likelihood of the particular
choices as well as the observed outcomes. For a student that decides to attend college for 4 years,
with observed choices {dci1, dci2, dci3, dci4} and grade outcomes {Gi1, Gi2, Gi3, Gi4} his likelihood
can be successively conditioned on his prior outcomes and choices:
L(Ω; dci1, ..., d
c
i4, Gi1, ..., Gi4|XHSi , qi, θi) =
L(Ω;Gi1|dci1, XHSi , qi, θi)L(Ω; dci1|XHSi , qi, θi)×
L(Ω;Gi2|dci2, XHSi , qi, θi)L(Ω; dci2|Gi1, dci1, XHSi , qi, θi)×
L(Ω;Gi3|dci3, XHSi , qi, θi)L(Ω; dci3|dci1, dci2, Gi1, Gi2, XHSi , qi, θi)×
L(Ω;Gi4|dci4, XHSi , qi, θi)L(Ω; dci4|dci1, dci2, dci3, Gi1, Gi2, Gi3, XHSi , qi, θi)
(A.7)
where I use the fact that current grades are independent of the past history of grades, conditional
on the major chosen in that period, endowment XHSi , the quality of the university q, and the
information embedded in the agent’s unobserved type θn (preferences for major, and major-specific
ability Anj ). The likelihood contributions of grades are normal densities:
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}, j ∈ {S,N} (A.8)
If the individual drops out and chooses to work in that period, their likelihood contribution from
their wages is the same as in Eqn. A.4, with the wage equation coefficients corresponding to those
from the unskilled sector. There is no outcome likelihood contribution for home production.
The agent’s choice probabilities are more involved. In each period when the agent is able to
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attend college, they receive an unskilled wage offer, so the standard logistic choice likelihood (over
the preference shock) must be integrated over the wage shock if the individual does not choose to
work in the unskilled market. At t = 4,
L(Ω; dci4|dci1, dci2, dci3, Gi1, Gi2, Gi3, XHSi , qi, θi) =∫
εWiU4
L(Ω; dci4|dci1, dci2, dci3, Gi1, Gi2, Gi3, XHSi , qi, θi, εWiUt)dF (εWiU4) (A.9)





γnij4 + βEGn,qij4 [V
n,skilled(1(M = j), Gi)] if j = dci3
γp ·WU(0, eUi4) + γiU4 + βE[V unskilled(xUi5 = 1)] if j = U
βE[V unskilled(xUi5 = 0)] if j = H
(A.10)
where the first term’s expectation is taken over the grade to be received in period 4 (Gn,qij4) according











Note that having dci4 = d
c
i3 is the restriction on major choice at t = 4. Choosing to work or
drop out causes the student to enter the unskilled sector with either 1 or 0 years of accumulated
experience in the next year. Choosing to continue in college causes the student to enter the skilled
labor market, unless they fail out, in which case they are identical to a student that enters t = 5
with no accumulated unskilled work experience. The failout condition is equivalent to:
V skilled(Mi, Gi, t = 5) = V
unskilled(xUi5 = 0), ∀Gi < 2.0 (A.12)
Otherwise, the ex-ante value functions for the moment of entry into the labor market are derived
from backwards recursion for the skilled/unskilled labor markets.
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Note that as a result of the student’s labor market outcomes depending on their final grade and
major choice, the conditional value function will depend on the past history of grades, namely snit
will contain the entire history of grades and educational choices when in college. This contrasts
with the labor market, where snit can be fully summarized by the accumulated experience in the
various sectors xit; the terminal GPA, major, and school quality; and the unobserved type n.
The wage-shock-conditional choice likelihood is thus logistic:
L4(d
c
4|dci1, dci2, dci3, Gi1, Gi2, Gi3, XHSi , qi, θi, εWiUt) =
exp vj4(si4, qi, θi, ε
W
iU4)∑




If the unskilled sector is chosen, the wage shock εWiUt is known so the integral in Eqn. A.9 reduces
to a single logit; otherwise the wage shock is unobserved and has to be integrated over.
Similarly, for the year 3 conditional value functions, I replace the occupational value function
in Eqn. A.10 with the college major choice ex-ante value function, and take an expectation over
the unknown at t = 3 grade outcome Gn,qij3 :




γniSt + βEGn,qiS3 [V (d
c
i3 = S,Gi1, Gi2, Gi3)|si3],
if j = S and either
dci1 = S or d
c
i2 = S
γniNt + βEGn,qiN3 [V (d
c
i3 = S,Gi1, Gi2, Gi3)|si3], if j = N
γp ·WU(0, εWiU3) + γiU3 + βE[V unskilled(xUi4 = 1)], if j = U
βE[V unskilled(xUi4 = 0)] if j = H
(A.14)
As before, the choice likelihood is an integral of logit probabilities over the unobserved un-
skilled wage shock, if the agent does not choose to work in the unskilled sector; otherwise it is a
single logit probability since the wage offer is observed.
Analogous likelihood expressions are present for t = 2 and t = 1, with the ex-ante value
functions depending on whether or not the student has taken STEM courses at least once, so that
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they have the option of taking STEM at t = 3.
A.3.3 Likelihood Simulation
Calculating any of the choice probabilities and ex-ante value functions in the likelihood ex-
pression requires a numeric integration, either over (unobserved) wage shocks in the skilled or
unskilled labor market sectors, or integrating over grade shocks when calculating the discounted
expected future payoff while in school. There is no need to numerically integrate over preference
shocks, as they either factor directly into the logistic choice probaiblities or admit a closed-form in
computing the ex-ante value functions.
To perform these integrations and to ensure repeatability of results, I take discrete draws from
the corresponding (multivariate) normal draws of wages; contrast this with other methods such as
Monte Carlo integration, which will generate different results per calculation due to randomness.
For the skilled labor market sector, prior to time t = 24, i.e. the first 20 periods of calculations,
I use 4 draws (at quantiles 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.80) for each of the 3 sectors, for a total of 64 wage
draws to integrate over; for the final 10 periods, which have the largest state space and associated
computational cost, I only use 2 draws per sector. While reducing the number of draws used
for the integration from 4 to 2 for the final 10 periods does result in meaningful changes in the
absolute values of the ex-ante value functions (and hence the NPVs used in determining the payout
of graduating from college), the changes in the ex-ante value functions relative to each other are
fairly small. This means that the choice likelihoods, which are determined from differences in the
ex-ante value functions, exhibit relatively small bias using a coarser integration, while computation
times are cut roughly in half. Since I observe at most 11 periods of skilled labor choices in the
data, the computational savings justify a coarser integration for later, unobserved periods. When
calculating the ex-ante value functions for estimating the educational sector parameters or forward
simulating the model, I use 4 draws at all times, since I only have to calculate the ex-ante value
functions once rather than repeatedly as in estimation.
For the unskilled labor market sector and educational sector, the size of the state space is
significantly smaller (either due to only having 2 states- unskilled labor and home production; or
only 4 periods- the 4 years of college), so I integrate over the 9 deciles of the normally distributed
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unskilled wage shocks, or the 19 5-percentiles of the grade shocks. Since the grade shocks occur
after the decision is made, I do not need to simulate them jointly, unlike for the skilled labor market
sector.
A.4 Bootstrap Procedure
The standard errors used in the estimation results are generated via bootstrap. The procedure
used to generate the bootstrap samples resembles the procedure used to generate counterfactuals
and compute goodness of fit. The steps are:
1. Draw a sample of size N = 306 individuals, which are defined by their high school covari-
ates and college characteristics.
2. For each individual, draw their unobserved type according to the estimated posterior proba-
bility distribution of types for that particular individual.
3. Simulate the lifetime of shocks in grades, wages, and preferences, as well as the agents’
sequential decisions according to the model and their realized shocks.
4. Estimate the resulting observations using the sequential E-M algorithm.
5. Repeat the procedure a total of B = 50 times.







(θ̂b − ¯̂θb)(θ̂b − ¯̂θb)′ (A.15)
with ¯̂θb = 150
∑50
b=1 θ̂b.
A.5 Out Of Sample Model Fit in Skilled Labor Market
My data contain an additional 848 observations of 184 men for which I have incomplete or
missing educational data, but observed that they obtained a bachelor’s degree and have labor market
decisions and outcomes (Table A.7). While this data was not used in the main estimation, it can
provide a useful test of out of sample model fit for the labor market model and parameters.
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Table A.9: Yearly Labor Choice Transition Matrix for College Graduates, Out-Sample
Choice t
Choice t− 1 HP STEM Aff. HSS Aff. Unaff.
HP
Actual 16.4 12.7 34.5 36.4
Sim 18.9 13.5 35.2 32.3
STEM Aff.
Actual 2.4 86.2 5.7 5.7
Sim 2.3 84.7 6.3 6.7
HSS Aff.
Actual 1.1 2.7 85.0 11.2
Sim 2.9 3.8 83.6 9.6
Unaff.
Actual 1.1 4.6 16.2 78.2
Sim 2.8 2.5 8.7 86.0
Results are for up to 8 years after college. Values reported in %. Rows sum to 100%.
It is likely these individuals have a different distribution of unobserved types relative to the
main sample: only 15.2 percent of them have a STEM degree, versus 21.1 percent in the main
sample. Thus, I first estimate the proportion of individuals in each unobserved type, taking all
of the other labor market parameters as fixed; I do this by using the self-consistency condition
present in the E-M algorithm, by finding the fixed point values of the out-sample type proportions
such that conditional on the observed choices and outcomes, the averages over all individuals
of the posterior probabilities of each individual being a given type equals the out-sample type
proportions. I estimate the type proportions in the out-sample to be (0.379, 0.353, 0.268). I then
proceed as in the labor market goodness of fit section: for each individual, from their unobserved
type distribution, draw a type, and conditional on their transcript at the time of graduation (major,
GPA, school quality), simulate their lifetime of outcomes. I do this 15 times for each individual.
The transition matrix is given in Table A.9, and the yearly choice probabilities are given in
Table A.10. In general, the choice probabilities and transitions are well-replicated by the model,
although interestingly enough, the model overpredicts persistence for working in the unaffiliated
sector relative to the data.
The observed wages are also plotted in Figs. A.3 and A.4. While the modeled wages for STEM
majors roughly track the data, the modeled wages for non-STEM majors are consistently higher,
particularly for those with GPA above the median. Splitting along major, GPA, and occupational
sector (Fig. A.5), it is clear that there is a general overprediction of earnings for non-STEM majors
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Table A.10: Occupational Choice Probabilities for Out-sample, by Years Since Graduation
Data Simulated
Time HP STEM HSS Unaff. HP STEM HSS Unaff.
1 25.9 13.6 22.2 38.3 30.0 10.4 25.6 34.0
2 6.3 17.0 32.1 44.7 7.9 15.8 39.1 37.2
3 4.5 18.5 31.8 45.2 4.8 18.0 41.5 35.7
4 1.3 21.1 40.1 37.5 3.3 19.4 42.8 34.5
5 2.8 23.4 37.2 36.6 3.0 20.0 42.7 34.3
6 0.8 20.6 39.7 38.9 2.1 20.4 41.9 35.6
7 1.0 19.8 38.6 40.6 1.5 20.3 42.4 35.8
8 1.7 16.9 40.7 40.7 1.4 21.5 39.5 37.7
Time is years since graduation. Probabilities are in %
working in the HSS sector, for both high and low GPA. Comparison to the estimating sample
(see Fig. A.5 vs. Fig. A.1) shows that this discrepancy is driven by fundamental differences
between the data and out-sample: while in the estimating sample the average annual earnings for a
non-STEM major in the HSS sector with an above-median GPA reaches $35,000 by 3 years after
graduation and levels out at over $42,000 by 6 years; in the out-sample it is $20,000 by 3 years and
still trending upwards at around $30,000 by 6 years.
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Figure A.3: Wage Profile for Out-Sample, by Major and GPA
Figure A.4: Wage Profile for Out-Sample, by Major and Occupational Sector
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Figure A.5: Wage Profile for Out-Sample, by Major, GPA, and Occupational Sector
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